Valery Karbalevich: The EU has no clear strategy in relation to Belarus

The principal difference of the current Minsk-Brussels dialog from the one at the times of 2008-2010 thaw is that now Belarusan authorities don’t even pretend to carry out internal liberalization.

Over the last months the official Minsk has seriously activated in European direction: not only Belarusan officials visit Europe but European officials also don’t miss any opportunity to visit Belarus, as if there are no political prisoners in Belarus, and the EU has never put forward its demands on liberalization to the official Minsk.

What is happening in Minsk-Brussels relations, and what has caused another “thaw”?

EuroBelarus Information Service asked these questions to Valery Karbalevich, political scientist.

- Official Minsk demonstrates astonishing activity at the EU territory: basically two days ago the Belarusan Foreign Minister visited Vienne, whereas Belarusan delegation held negotiations on the Conclusion by Belarus and the European Union of the Agreements on Simplification of Visa Procedures and Readmission. What is the cause of such activation among Belarusan authorities?

- The official Minsk is trying to use Ukrainian crisis for mending relations with the EU. Apart from challenges and crises, Ukrainian crisis also brings new opportunities. Belarusan authorities decided to use new threats. In the times when Russia and the West are in confrontation, the problem of values steps back, while geopolitics steps forward.

The mood in Europe is changing. I even noted that the official parliamentary delegation visited the Czech Republic and was received at the official level. As we can see, the delegation of the Belarusan parliament, which the West hasn’t been recognizing since 1996, is received in the European Union.

- Does it mean that the sanctions against Minsk are no longer a barrier for renovation of the relations?

- In some way sanctions are a barrier for the renovation of dialog, as many Belarusan officials including Aliaksandr Lukashenka are banned from entering the EU. Political prisoners are a fact that makes relations complicated, as it is because of the political prisoners that sanctions were introduced.

However, in spite of sanctions, the process of renovating the dialog is slowly taking place. And it was Ukrainian crisis that launched that.

- The visit of Gunnar Wiegand to Minsk demonstrated that Europe is mostly talking with the official Minsk. Similar “thaw” in relations between Minsk and Brussels happened in 2010, and everyone knows its sad results. What goals does the EU follow by reestablishing relations with “the last dictator of Europe”?

- I wouldn’t make such categorical conclusion regarding Gunnar Wiegand’s visit: he still held meetings with the wives of the political prisoners and the expert community.

There is no doubt that Brussels stakes on the contacts with the official Minsk. One principal difference of this dialog from the thaw of 2008-2010 is that now Belarusan authorities don’t even try to carry out internal liberalization. The official Minsk has a firm stance on this; and Europe has no illusions regarding inner political liberalization in the course of the dialog.

I think that Europe is trying to draw Belarus out of Russia’s geopolitical influence, even though the EU has no clear strategy in relation to Belarus. We see a reactive process; EU is acting mechanically: using the difference in Belarus’ and Russia’s stances on the Ukrainian crisis, the EU is trying to rip Belarus out of Russia’s arms.

- Can it happen so that the desire to drag Belarus out of Russia’s arms will make the EU recognize the new presidential campaign? In case nothing extraordinary like Ploshcha-2010 happens in 2015?

- I don’t quite understand the term “recognize” or “not recognize” the election. Indeed, Europe didn’t recognize the presidential election of 2010; Ministers were calling Lukashenka “a loser”, but now they deal with the official Minsk, and the Ambassadors present credentials to the acting president. Thus, we have rhetoric, while the real politics largely differs from it.

I am sure that the observers from the OSCE will be present at the presidential election of 2015. They will once again write about non-observance of democratic standards, and what? European capitals will all perceive the conclusion drawn by the OSCE differently; however, it won’t affect the process of the dialog’s reestablishment.

I wouldn’t stake on the president campaign of 2015 too much.