Belarusian-European relations. Outcomes of 2008

Unmotivated movement forward

If one looks at the events and actions that have occurred in the past year, he or she would not see anything that actually explained the «warming» pf the relationships. They are empty and devoid, at least, with regard to the reasons that could shift the long-standing positions. Neither Belarus nor Europe had done anything that would have forced each of the parties to modify the established tactics against the other party. It is assumed that the cause of the “warming” lies not within the actions and events, however within the modification of the relations per se. One can say that the relationships have changed due to their own inherent dynamics. We can not remain in a state of cold war and alienation indefinitely. Therefore the situation was to change due to the internal causes. Indeed, the inherent dynamics is the main cause of the “warming” of the Belarusian-European relations in 2008.

For the sake of justice it should be noted, that there is one event that all politicians, analysts and commentators are drawing attention to. This is the reaction of the official Minsk to the Russian-Georgian conflict, reflected in the non-recognition of the quasi-entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Apart from Nicaragua and Cuba, this «independence», was not recognized by anyone. Therefore an omission became an ‘action’. At the same time one can not ignore the fact that inaction and a failure to act are the usual and customary reactions of the Belarusian regime to the majority of the external international events. Therefore, even such «bright» political event, indeed, could not produce significant changes, and could be considered as an excuse only.

Amorphous Belarusian foreign policy contrasts sharply with the intensity and speed of the response to the internal political developments. Moreover, domestic political reaction is more often preventive. The main political event of the last year would have been the parliamentary elections. De facto, during the election campaign and during the elections themselves the authorities were in the ‘idle’ mode. These omissions of actions have not made the parliamentary elections neither free, nor democratic. This fact stumped the European observers. Perhaps this explains the first null and slurred score of the last elections. In the meantime, the monitoring and evaluation of the major political events in the country should have provided with arguments for building the future EU policy towards Belarus. There are no coherent arguments, the EU has not received them. However even without having these arguments Europe has become much more tolerant to the situation in Belarus. It only means that the shift to the “warming” of the relations was presupposed even before the elections.

Therefore the reasons for the warming of Belarusian-European relations should be sought not within the actions and events however within the evolution of the subjects of these relations.

Belarusian side: searching for new ideas and partners

An explanation of what happened last year could be found while analyzing the events of 2006. Following his victory during the elections, Lukashenko has not only defeated his opponents, but also the entire political opposition, and thus became fully responsible for what happens in the country. Until 2006, the regime could write off bad economy and political difficulties in the country at the machinations and intrigues of the opposition. After the elections, his power was strengthened to the extent that he faced no dangers and could easily lead the country to prosperity. This fact has become a major challenge for the Belarusian regime. It had no constructive ideas, approaches and programs. Regardless of the most favorable political climate and very good economic conditions the development of the country started slowing down.

Potential exploitation of the Russian factor in foreign economic activity is virtually exhausted. Inaction, passivity and lack of participation in European and global processes have resulted in the assessment of the internal economic and political conditions as not favourable for investment according to the international standards. This makes civilized cooperation in most areas impossible. By early 2008 the authorities started realizing their unwillingness to bear the full responsibility for the country.

In addition, the Government and key institutions of the state are simply not competent to rule the country under modern conditions and in compliance with the established international practice. Bearing this in mind it should be recognized that the shift of the Belarusian foreign policy towards Europe has not happened, and could not happen. What we are witnessing is not so much co-operation with Europe, but rejection of non-participation. Waiver of non-participation does not mean an intention to participate.

For full participation is necessary to formulate a clear foreign-trade doctrine and position, but its wording lacks competence. Non-participation in Pan-European structures deprives the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, civil society leaders and economic understanding of what is today's world, depriving them of their experience in negotiation and partnership deals.

Therefore all that European politicians and observers have noted as a positive trend in Belarus, is nothing but a demonstration of malleability. The Belarusian regime looks at Europe in order to find new ideas and to understand what to do with the country, for which it took the full responsibility. This relative economic liberalization that we have witnessed in recent months can be attributed to these ‘borrowed’ ideas as well. It is too early to say that this is a programme of liberalization that it is done comprehensively, with the understanding of the necessary consequent steps and of the possible consequences they might lead. It should be emphasized that the need to change the whole programme of the regime it is caused by the prevailing circumstances and the course of its evolution. While recognizing this need and searching for new and effective steps, the authorities for the first time «looked at» Europe not as a tool to be used in the political game with Russia, but as a possible partner in a relationship.

European side: Belarusian issue in foreign policy

European politicians and observers do not fail to understand that the Belarusian regime over the past two years has not changed any of the parameters and criteria. Yet the European Union makes clear and visible steps toward Belarus. Therefore, these steps are not being caused by the actions of Belarus, also can be understood only through a change in the attitude of Europe itself.

Over the last decades, Europe was looking at Belarus through the prism of relations with Russia and as a result Europe was late to realize that in the immediate vicinity of its borders developed a regime which is a particular problem per se. The smooth, almost triumphal spread of democracy and market relations in the former Soviet-bloc countries in the 90s, brought to life by the illusion that democracy and the market economy have no alternatives, and that these processes have no serious opponents. The Belarusian regime emerged as such an opponent, and by demonstrating the positive dynamics in the national economy, could make an alternative to democracy and market economy. Real or perceived achievement of the Belarusian regime are becoming arguments and a ‘showcase’ of the radical revanchist political forces in Ukraine, Russia and even in some new EU countries. They speak in favor of a different development path than the one proposed by Europe.

Accelerated reform and transformation of political systems and economies of the former Soviet bloc in the 90s is driven not only by the desire to get rid of the dark socialist past, but also by the hope to join the EU. In this «favorable» environment were formed the basic guidelines and principles for the relationship with the neighboring countries, which are implemented via programmes and standards. Today the situation is fundamentally different. The European Union is no longer involved in the expansion process and, hence, can not offer arguments for the EU enthusiasts in the countries remaining outside the EU. In reverse, the there are more arguments from Eurosceptics. Beyond traditionalism and conservatism in recent years, they appeal to the positive example of Belarus. The collision of these arguments becomes a clear weakness of the European programmes of cooperation and good neighbourhood. That is why Europe is being forced to look for new ideas and to formulate new proposals, it has to develop a Euro-Belarusian relations, taking into account the reluctance and inability of the Belarusian regime to build such relationship.

One can only understand the changing policies of Brussels in relation to Belarus in 2008 as an attempt to solve this problem. The EU implements in relation to Belarus educational tactics and encourages any actions and steps by the Belarusian regime in the European direction, both effective and ineffective, both real and imaginary. The main results, which can be achieved by such tactic is the enhancement of the participation of Belarus in the European processes, its inclusion in European and international organizations and structures. Indeed, to date, Belarus remains the last European country geographically, that is not a member of the Council of Europe, the pan-European programmes ignore all except the programmes of technical and humanitarian assistance. Programmes in which Belarus is involved, are primarily related to the settlement of boundaries, cross-border cooperation and border trade.

Inclusion and participation in the European and global processes, among other things, is reflected in the assumed country's legal and financial obligations. Legal obligations are listed in the signed international treaties and agreements. In this regard, last year did not bring anything new, perhaps with an exception of the opening of the European Commission office in Minsk. Therefore, the only obligations that bind Belarus with the advanced civilized world is the external debt. The absence of the external debt for several years has been a source of pride of the Belarusian government. Really it is indicative of self-sufficiency and isolation of Belarus. Dedicated to the end of the year IMF loan in the amount of 2,5 billion dollars a concerted programme of economic policy measures, including monetary policy, the system of exchange rate policy, management of fiscal policy, a reduction in public investment and trust bank lending, as well as a strict limitation of wages in the public sector. Thus, together with money received from IMF Belarus has ideas and technology to manage the economy. In any case, credit obligations of Belarus is the only argument for the seriousness of the intention of the regime to move in the direction of economic liberalization.

The demonstrative steps taken by the Belarusian regime can not be interpreted as a real course for reform, democratization and Europeanization. Similarly, the actions of Europe can not yet be regarded as a long-term policy. The educational tactics is a temporary measure, rather than a coherent strategy. Each of these individual measures requires adequate and equal-time and possibly a temporary response by Belarus. However, while the Belarusian regime still has the resources and opportunities for the continuation of the implementation of its ‘old’ policy, the resources of the EU with regard to the enlargement and to the previous policy towards the neighboring countries is almost exhausted. The new challenges, both economic (including energy security), and political in the face of the authoritarian and prone to authoritarian regimes require innovation, new ideas and suggestions.

Belarusian civil society: participation on a personal level

Throughout the period of the rule of the current regime the Belarusian society gained almost no ability to influence the policy. And it relates not only to the conditions established by authoritarianism, but also with the way the existence and activities of the civil society per se. Since 1994, it entered into the confrontation with the regime: self-built and under combat. In their current state the civil society organizations are ill-equipped to cooperate with the Belarusian regime, both locally and nationally. Meanwhile, the activity of the civil society could facilitate the transition from inconsistent measures and treatment in Europe towards a sustainable trend for Europeanization. Civil society could be the third participant in this process. But this should be coordinated through programmes, individual actions and activities of all parties: the EU and its institutions, the Belarusian regime and the civil society.

Set in the confrontation and struggle with the regime the civil society focuses on the actions and activities of resistance and pressure, however due to the weakness of the civil society and its underdevelopment it can not resist the pressure and is little effective. The inefficiency of pressure and resistance in a complex with the unwillingness to cooperate and interact puts the civil society organizations, and all non-state institutions in Belarus in a difficult position: to act in the old ways and old methods is inappropriate, and new forms and methods were not elaborated, not even discussed seriously.

The existing institutions in the country are only one and a half decades old and it is very difficult to change the vertical structure of power that is not adapted to the changes. However it is also difficult to change the existing structures of the civil society. They are ineffective and weak, however good at surviving. Without those changes they are hardly prepared for cooperation and interaction.

The best way out of this difficult situation could be cooperation and collaboration at a personal rather than institutional level. Moreover, such interaction at a personal level is in the common interest. The regime needs new ideas and approaches, as well as the carriers of these ideas. Bearers of such ideas are in the structures of civil society and most of them under the circumstances unclaimed in marginal condition. In the end, the interests of their marginality are to return to active and constructive activities. The Belarusian regime could make a proposal to experts and specialists from the civil society or vice versa, experts and civil society would have to make a proposal to the regime.

The question is, who was the first to decide to do so? However regardless of the goodwill of others and it may be an obstacle in the face of the public opinion, which is ready to condemn the collaboration of everyone who will cooperate with the regime. But it will go away otherwise we will delay the process of the Belarusian-European approach at the outset. It is necessary to prepare the public opinion to ensure that staff update the state structures and institutions through the replenishment of specialists from the opposition and non-state actors can and should become common practice, more precisely the main characteristic of the social practices in the near future.

Actually the invitation of the opposition and civil society to cooperate in various forms would be the best evidence and proof of the seriousness of the intentions of the regime. If the ban on the practice of the profession for ideological and political reasons will not be lifted soon, it would be reasonable to question the willingness of the regime to change and the sincerity of his intentions. Attempts to solve the problem the country is facing without the participation of the civil society only by the incompetent and conformist government officials are obviously doomed to failure.

The transition from the country’s policy of self-sufficiency and self-isolation to openness and full cooperation with the European Community, of course, has two dimensions. One of them is obvious for all, including government officials, and ideologues of the regime, is the foreign policy dimension. However the internal openness or at least movement towards it is a must. Full participation in pan-European processes of the «closed society» is impossible. Of course, Europe, and every democratic country has from time to time to interact and to conduct business with the dictatorial regimes and «closed societies». In some cases it even managed to solve some local problems. Typically, such interactions have to be limited and acute conflict. Open and democratic regimes are prepared for the constructive engagement in the contemporary world affairs. Therefore, the Euro-Belarusian convergence now depends not only in the subjective willingness or unwillingness of the parties, but also on the structure of the Belarusian society. Whether the Belarusian society is ready for the radical change? This question should be answered by all together.

Vladimir Matskevich

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