A political analyst Uladzimir Matskevich replies
to the questions of the www.eurobelarus.info
Q: European politicians have
been contemplating for a while whether to invite
Belarus to become a partner within
the Eastern Partnership programme or not. In February our country was visited
by a number of high level officials from various influential institutions.
Whether they sincerely believed in democratization and liberalization in
Belarus?
A: No. No one believed anything. The European
institutions were not well aware about
Belarus,
however now that the issue of the inclusion of
Belarus into the Eastern
Partnership programme as a full partner is under consideration they were
consulting with serious experts. All the ‘cosmetic’ changes made by the
Belarusian authorities fooled no one. Europe has no illusions about
liberalization in
Belarus.
Therefore the inclusion of
Belarus
into the programme should not be regarded as an award or a prize for liberalization
and democratization. The ongoing discussion is exactly about the mechanism of
democratization and rapprochement of our country and of our society to the
European standards. One should be treating it in this particular manner.
Q: What does the European Union expect from
Belarus?
A:
Today the European Union is disappointed about the efforts of the civil society
and the Belarusian opposition to shift the country towards the democratic
changes in one way or another. Therefore the European Union started to
strengthen its own efforts. However in order for the EU countries to influence
the process of democratization in
Belarus there should be certain
legal mechanisms for that. The latter is only possible when
Belarus is
integrated into the bilateral neighbourhood relations and is integrated into
the common European processes. The Eastern Partnership Programme is such
integration mechanism into the ‘new’
Europe
for these six post-Soviet countries. Exclusion of
Belarus from the programme would
mean that it was totally excluded from the civilization processes of the most
developed region in the world.
Moreover,
the geo-strategic factor is also very important, i.e. the proximity to
Europe. For instance,
Belarus
fully separates
Lithuania
from the East. Therefore its bordering location does not allow the European
Union to ignore what happens inside the country.
It
may sound as a paradox however the decision to include
Belarus into the programme was affected by three
crisis: economic, world and crisis, related to the external political
imperialistic ambitions of
Russia
(with regard to the Northern Caucuses, Russian-Georgian conflict). These three
types of crisis pushed forward those slow developing processes existing between
Belarus and
Europe that were ongoing for many years without any
outcomes.
Q: Belarusian official authorities welcomed the invitation of
Belarus into
the programme. What benefits and gains do they count on?
A:
Primarily what they count on are the economic benefits. Due to the fact that
opportunities for the development of the Belarusian economy via East, via trade
with
Russia
are almost exhausted. It is clear that certain dependence of
Belarus and the
EU Member States on the energy supplies exists and will continue existing for
yet many years. However opportunities at the internal Russian market for the
intensification of the Belarusian export have almost reached to their limit and
are also exhausted. Therefore further development of the Belarusian economy
demands finding exit to the European markets. With regard to the trade with the
European countries we can not boast with significant achievements, Europe is
underdeveloped market for
Belarus.
We have to reach out for the European markets. However this necessity in its
turn will require bringing the Belarusian industry, production and agriculture
to the European standards. This impulse is vital for us.
Q: What is the role of
Moscow
in this case? It has to realize that in case of rapprochement of
Belarus with Europe it will start getting out of
the influence of
Russia…
A:
Moscow is very
careful about the European integration processes and it can not afford to lose
its influence.
Belarus,
Ukraine as well as the Caucuses countries are
regarded by
Russia
as a sphere of its influence and a sphere of its vital interests. Therefore the
pressure put on the Eastern Partnership Programme by
Moscow is obvious and perhaps is has not yet
reached its maximum. The continued unrolling of the programme may provoke even
more radical steps.
As
of toady
Moscow
is forced to compromise with the new European initiative. However if we look at
the shaping content of the programme we’ll notice that its depth has decreased
compared with the initial version (i.e. the Polish-Swedish initiative put
forward in July last year). Later on the content of this doctrine was softened
following influence of
Moscow
and with efforts of the German government. I believe that
Moscow will continue applying its diplomatic
efforts in order to neutralize this initiative.
Moreover
each of the six countries that are included into the programme have different
attitude towards it. For instance,
Ukraine
has moved a lot further in reaching agreements with Europe on various issues of
its concern and the Eastern Partnership for
Ukraine is not a radical or critical
step forward. For other countries it is a huge impulse for internal
modernization. On the other hand, neither
Moldova
nor
Azerbaijan or
Armenia do not express special enthusiasm with
regard to the new initiative of
Europe.
Moldova is taking
relatively active part in the integration process within the Black Sea Region and
the government of Mr Voronin considers those programmes rather well elaborated.
Azerbaijan and
Armenia are not willing to abandon their good
relations with
Moscow.
Belarus
as well wants to play for both sides. In this sense
Ukraine
and
Georgia
become leaders while the other countries are in the rearguard. All these inconsistencies
become barriers for the Eastern Partnership Programme in obtaining particular
distinct features.
Q: It is
obvious that the leader of
Belarus
plays so to say a double game. He would like to become closer to Europe while
not spoiling relations with
Moscow.
What could be the outcomes of such balancing in between?
Mr. Lukashenko realizes the necessity to have closer
relations with
Europe. He will be working in
this direction and he might even be able to convince Kremlin that it is vital
for
Belarus.
Neither of the Russian counter approaches or counter proposals would be able to
deflect
Belarus
from the Western direction. It is a different issue that
Moscow
is extremely worried about its geostrategic and military interest in
Belarus…
Therefore it would only be natural for
Moscow
to have nervous reaction. Every step forward by
Belarus
towards closer relations with Europe will provoke the corresponding reaction
from
Moscow.
Q: So far
the issue of whether Aleksandr Lukashenko will be invited to
Prague
to take part in the
Summit
of the Eastern Partnership programme remains open…
A: It is a very delicate and a very conflicting issue
due to the fact that on one side Belarus should join the programme however on
the other side everyone knows that Belarus is the ‘last dictatorship in Europe’.
Therefore in case they decide to join
Belarus, then what happens to the
sanctions against the Belarusian officials and the President? It would be
illogical to include the country into the wide integration process and to
continue with application of sanctions. On the other hand the invitation of the
President would signify the acknowledgment of the fact that the country has stepped
on the track of democracy. This is the main point behind considerations and debates
of the European officials.
With regard to Mr. Lukashenko, he may take advantage
of the invitation while implementing his internal propaganda, in case he is
invited to the
Summit.
In case he is not invited there, it could also be used for his own benefit. Both
scenarios are arguable. The decision has to be adopted in the nearest future. Also
the considerations and debates among the Europeans could be used and regarded
from the research point of view, i.e. they could be used to judge to what
extent the Belarusian authorities and the leader of the country take various
proposals with regard to the Eastern Partnership Programme seriously. Would he
like to go to the
Summit
himself? Will he use any effort in order to receive this invitation to
Prague? Will he send the
Foreign Minister to replace him? The issue that looks so simple on the surface
becomes more significant and symbolic this way. Due to this symbolism the environment
around the situation becomes so delicate and conflicting.
Q: The
Eastern Partnership Programme envisages a wide participation of the civil
society in it. Why such importance is attached to the third sector as contrary
to the opposition and political parties?
A: It is obvious that the opposition politicians do
not represent the entire opposition as such, all those that do not agree with
the current authorities and the regime. Therefore a large number of the civil
society representatives today voice their opinions with regard to the
Belarusian-European relations. Opinions of the third sector and various
confessional institutions today may become decisive. The fact that the Eastern
Partnership envisages the creation of the Civil Forum is not a coincidence. The
civil society along with the representatives of the authorities of a country
will represent their countries in the programme. Indeed, the civil society does
not have the ‘voting’ right in all of the six countries. However with regard to
the Belarusian third sector, one might say that it became stronger, has its own
ambitions, has formed an opinion with regard to the participation in the “Road
Map” and about the integration of
Belarus into the European
community.
Ludmila Korsak
[email protected]