Eastern Partnership: new actions, old challenges

Recent developments

Opportunities and challenges

The situation with the prospects of the Eastern Partnership per se is not less complicated. The initiative came out as the result of a very delicate balance of interests and any unreasonable actions could easily destroy it. In another time and under different circumstances, the initiative would have never been able to become something real. In a situation where the European Union as a whole is tired, lost the initiative and is morally ready for further expansion, the emergence of new pro-active initiatives for closer relations with its Eastern neighbors is a kind of miracle. It is only due to the overlay of a series of random factors that led the forces interested in changing the Eastern policy of the European Union to their temporary preponderance. The convergence of three crises: the global economic crisis, the Georgian-Russian crisis and the energy crisis led to the weakening of the position of the opponents of the active policy with regard to the EU Eastern neighbors. All three of the crisis required an adequate political response however there were no specific options of how it should be. The Polish-Czech-Swedish Eastern Initiative at the time was the only suitable response option. The skeptics of the Eastern Partnership simply had to relinquish their supporters temporarily.

Nevertheless there is still an opportunity to reverse the process. The easiest way would be to make the Eastern Partnership senseless by changing the content and objectives of the initiative. The greatest threat here represents the discussed possibility of including Russia. European officials repeated their mantra that the Eastern Partnership is not the anti-Russian initiative, however rather convinced otherwise. The Eastern Partnership actually aims at the Europeanization of the neighboring countries, which will automatically help to reduce the Russian influence in the region. The inclusion of Russia is into the mechanisms of partnership would enable it to block the unwanted processes and to use the Eastern Partnership, in its geopolitical interests.

Another danger for the Eastern Partnership lies within the ways of formalization of the process, i.e. to base it in the initial stages on the mechanisms that may lead to the profanation of the idea. The pragmatic aspirations of the EU with regard to the issues of energy and economic security are quite clear. The desire of the partner countries to obtain economic benefits from the cooperation with the EU is understandable too. However the simple satisfaction of the mutual interests would definitely not bring the countries to the European standards of democracy, good governance, rule of law, development of market relations. There is deficit of democracy suffered by the civil society of all six countries however the governments of these countries at the same time stand on the same deficits of democracy. It is therefore natural that multi and bilateral cooperation from the side of officials of the partner countries would seek to implement the scheme «pragmatic cooperation» of the Eastern Partnership and would reduce it to the economic cooperation. There reasons to doubt that contemporary European politicians and bureaucrats will be able to maintain tight mindset on adhering to their idealistic goals and oppose to such reduction, unless the mechanism of the implementation of the Eastern Partnership includes ways to restore these idealistic goals and to monitor the progress towards the European democratic standards. This is only possible if the views of the civil society are adequately taken into account in the partner countries and in case of the establishment of the mechanisms for its effective support by the formal structures of the European Union at the national level.

Idealism and pragmatism

However the dichotomy of idealism and pragmatism of the Eastern Partnership is not so simple as it seems at a glance. Or, it would be more accurate to say, there are some conflicting idealistic and somewhat not less controversial pragmatic attitudes. At the level of European politics, there are two trends: so to say «Pro Eastern Partnership» and «Contra Eastern Partnership». The first one represents basically new (and relatively prosperous) countries of the EU, EU-enthusiasts and enthusiasts of the EU-expansion however they are skeptics with regard to Russia. The second includes essentially the old EU countries, proponents of the Mediterranean Initiative and tired of the EU-expansion skeptics however enthusiasts of the European-Russian relations.

The pragmatism of the “Pro Eastern Partnership” block is about the reduction of the influence of Russia in the region and about the increase of the role of the EU in the foreign and domestic policies of the EU, while idealistic aspirations lie in the area of the promotion of the European values and standards further to the East. The block “Contra East Partnership” is pragmatically focused on maintaining the status quo in the European relations, weakening the influence of the transit countries, increased security, etc., with idealistic aspirations of creating common European space of prosperity and security, however only for the Europeans. They both rhetorically talk about democracy and human rights, and they both are really interested in increasing their own power, safety and welfare. However the meaning of rhetoric and of actions will be different.

Quite interesting is the combination of pragmatic and idealistic attitudes within the partner countries. The authorities of Belarus and Azerbaijan are focused exclusively on pragmatic aspects. For Lukashenko and for Aliyev the Eastern Partnership is additional opportunities for expansion of exports, maintaining economic growth and attracting investment, and they are not interested in making progress in terms of democracy and human rights. For Ukraine getting closer to Europe is not filled with economic interests only however is associated with the prospects for closer integration into the European space. This makes it paying attention to a broader range of cooperation issues. However, by many the Eastern Partnership with regard to Ukraine is perceived skeptically as it perceived as a regular unequal replacement of the proposal for EU membership. Moldova, Georgia and Armenia are likely to be occupied with the solution of their internal problems and they less able to identify specific interests with regard to the Eastern Partnership. This state of affairs is beneficial for Belarus and Azerbaijan and gives a chance to build the Eastern Partnership in accordance with their interests.

The civil society (including European and civil society of the partner countries) is not homogeneous in its pragmatic-idealistic aspirations. And different actors in different ways find a balance between the pragmatism and idealism. There is a fight between two approaches with regard to the Eastern Partnership. The first can be described as «instrumental», the second as «conditional». The essence of the instrumental approach is that the Eastern Partnership as a combination of structures and mechanisms is seen as an instrument of democratization and liberalization in partner countries. The pragmatic interest of the supporters of this approach is to embed into the mechanisms of the Eastern Partnership tools that would allow making impact on the domestic situation in the country. Ideally they seek to implement the principles of democracy and human rights. However, in contrast, the supporters of the «conditional» approach see the realization of these principles as a result, rather than a condition of the enrolling Eastern Partnership.

Supporters of «conditional» approach prefer to focus on the actual situation with human rights and the deficit of democracy. For them, the restoration of democracy and human rights is a condition for the start of any real interaction within the Eastern Partnership. Any negotiations and cooperation with the illegitimate and repressive regimes for them is evil. Pragmatism of «conditionalists» varies however implies continuation of the status quo and requires increased support for reasons of ideological affinity and moral purity, without regard to actual performance. This position paradoxically brings together opponents of the Eastern Partnership rhetorically insisting on implementation of human rights, with their own authoritarian regimes that tend to put issues of democracy and human rights out of the scope of the Eastern Partnership. Therefore there is growing antagonism between the ideologically close supporters of «instrumentalism» and the enthusiasts of the East Partnership. The official launch of the Eastern Partnership is a fait accompli. This means that the cooperation will begin where it will be possible. If the civil society refuses to participate, insisting on «conditional» principle, this collaboration will proceed without them. That seems to be starting to happen already.

Belarus and Eastern Partnership

Belarus perhaps is more interested in the Eastern Partnership than other countries. Both the authorities and the civil society are interested in it. The Belarusian regime has ackquired attractive prospects for economic benefits and convenience of new tools for manipulative games with Russia. Masterfully playing on the delicate balance between Brussels and Moscow, Lukashenka has managed to get political (better image in the West) and economic (Russian loans) benefits. In the mean time the Belarusian President found himself in an interesting situation. Now, in his rhetoric with the West, Lukashenko is an economic pragmatist (only the economy, any talk of values), while in rhetoric with Russia, he actively continues to appeal to idealistic values and positions of «eternal friendship among peoples».

The structures of the Belarusian civil society in general turned out to be more consolidated and active than the similar structures in other countries in the partnership. Recently organized meeting by the consortium «EuroBelarus» opened consultations on the Eastern Partnership and the Civil Society Forum to the maximum extent at the national level and it was the only such initiative among all of the six countries. On principle such consultations could become the basis for interactions between all actors of civil society in Belarus, as well as public associations such as «Belaya Rus» and the Belarusian Republican Youth Union, government institutions and representatives of the EU.

However, not all players accept open rules of the game. Over the last decade there were opaque mechanisms of interaction of the European institutions with Belarusian civil society and democratic opposition in place, as well as the tradition of non-relations within the country. Transfer of these relations in the public and open space will inevitably lead to a reconfiguration of the field. The traditional political players will try to avoid it, and use the usual mechanisms of unilateral political action: the political appeal of unilateral visits to Europe, secretive agreements, non-transparent congresses and others. A convenient way of enclosure will be participation in the open air «conditional» principle. Although such behavior is likely to leave on the sidelines of the main events those forces that adhere to such strategy.

High risks for civil society of Belarus on its way to real participation in the Eastern Partnership represent steps to be made by the regime. It is likely that civil society will be represented by quasi-public institutions. Community Advisory Board (Presidential Administration, the country marketing, media) could claim playing the role of the representative of the civil society. The only way to resist it could only be the involvement of the public and advisory boards in a broad and open discussion on the prospects and plans of the Eastern Partnership and the liberalization of the country.

Some conclusions

Events are developing rapidly, and if the governmental agencies’ strategy for the East partnership is simple, the civil society’s one is far less obvious. It becomes clear that the European institutions do not intend to address the participation of the civil society, and it will have to take its place within the structures of the Eastern Partnership independently. This requires a degree of consolidation and active pre-emptive action at the European and national level.

Andrei Yahorau