Andrei Kazakevich: Lukashenka is trying to abstain from Russian foreign-policy control

uainfo.org

Neutrality in Russia-Ukraine conflict proves that Belarusan authorities do not support Russia’s use of force in Ukraine and look upon it as a threat to Belarus’ sovereignty.

The political part in the State of the Nation Address delivered by Lukashenka on April 22 was concentrated around Belarus-Ukraine-Russia triangle. Lukashenka has repeatedly projecting Ukrainian events onto Belarus and on him personally.

What lies behind that? Andrei Kazakevich, the director of the Institute for Policy Studies Palіtychnaya Sphera (Political Sphere), in the interview with the EuroBelarus Information Service analyzes the State of the Nation Address.

- Aliaksandr Lukashenka stands against Ukraine’s federalization and is well aware that “our fellow-Russians don’t like my stance”. Can we say that this is a principal contradiction in Moscow and Minsk policies towards Ukraine?

- I believe so. The contradictions lie not only in the issue of Ukraine's federalization, but the status of Crimea, the legitimacy of new Ukrainian authorities, attitude towards the presidential election which are to take place in Ukraine, as well.

Thus, there are considerable differences in the official stances of Belarus and Russia on a number of important questions.

- Why is it happening?

- Lukashenka is, obviously, trying to take a neutral stance in Russia-Ukraine conflict, and judging from his personal beliefs, to abstain from Russian foreign-policy control.

We can name several reasons for that. Ukraine is important for Belarus, and if the relations are worsened, it can negatively affect our country. Moreover, neutrality leaves more space for maneuverings in the western direction. Thus, today’s position enables Belarus to step out of the escalation in the conflict between Russia and the West in Belarus’ relations with US and EU.

And finally, such stance basically says that Belarusan authorities do not support Russia’s use of force in Ukraine and look upon it as a threat to Belarus’ sovereignty and political future.

- On the one hand, Lukashenka announces that “we will be with Russia”, but on the other, that “they frighten us that tomorrow Putin will come here and seize our country. Wherever anybody comes, we will fight for our country”. Does it mean that Lukashenka seriously considers the threat of Belarus’ annexation by Russia?

- I think that mainly these words were just a rhetorical pun, but nevertheless, such scenarios are considered now. I don’t think that Lukashenka treats them as a real threat these days. However, Russia has crossed a certain line, has changed its way of politics towards its partners and opponents and is demonstrating readiness to use force, provoke violence, etc. In certain circumstances all this arsenal can be used against Belarus. It is a threat which requires thorough consideration and reaction.

- Both earlier, as well as several times during his address, Lukashenka kept saying that he is against Ukraine’s federalization. What threat does Ukraine’s federalization pose to Belarus and to Lukashenka personally?

- There is no direct personal threat to Lukashenka in Ukraine’s federalization; however, it means that Ukraine is destabilized and will disappear as an integral political player. But Belarus is interested in having one reliable partner in the south, not a conglomerate of regions. It is easier to negotiate with a single player, as well as it is easier to use it as a certain counterbalance to Russia in the region. While federalization will mean that Russia will get more opportunities to exert influence in the region, whereas space for Belarus’ foreign-policy maneuvering will be narrowed.

Besides, speaking against Ukraine’s federalization, Lukashenka makes certain concussions to Ukrainian side, demonstrating his independence in this issue.

- Lukashenka mentioned the need to cut the Gordian knot in relations with the EU yet again. Does he consider the improvement of Belarus-Europe relations to be certain insurance against Russia’s possible aggression? Or it is rather yet another attempt to start geopolitical swinging?

- The first variant doesn’t exclude the second. Belarus needs some counterbalance to Russia, especially with all the Ukrainian events and future signing of the Eurasian Economic Union foundation, which can limit the Belarusan sovereignty even further. These threats liven up the interest of Belarusan authorities to the establishment of better contacts with the West.

We should also mention that new “turn to Europe” has been under preparation for quite a long time, before the Ukrainian events, and Belarus wants to preserve certain dynamics in the western direction, though without any concussions.

- Does it mean that on the threshold of the presidential election campaign 2015 official Minsk wants to return its relations with the EU to the level of 2009-2010?

- At least there is a tendency of improving them. Here both political and economic logics are present. Europe has its markets, which can rescue some spheres of our industry. Europe is also a source of cheap loans. Europe is a strong economic force, and by improving our relations with it our economy could be improved as well.

Besides, if we are mentioning the future presidential campaign, it should be noted that Lukashenka’s address was partially aimed at pro-western electorate. He was talking about “the critics of the authorities”, and that even they should be united when faced with the outside threats. And through referring to the problems in relations with the neighbors, Lukashenka positions himself as a figure that unites the whole nation.

Lukashenka was starting his political career as a leader of pro-Russian/Soviet part of society; however, over the last years, starting approximately from 2008, we see that the authorities are trying to step out of the traditional political division, formed in the second half of 1990s, and get involved in the political game in all the sectors of the Belarusan society.