Andrei Kazakevich: Kremlin doesn’t have a clear strategy as to what to do with Ukraine

The role of a mediator between Russia and Ukraine ensures neutrality for Belarus in this conflict.

Tripartite negotiations on Ukraine that took place in Minsk on August 26 didn’t help to end the war. However, this meeting at the highest level can be viewed as start of a new stage in negotiation process that can inspire de-escalation. That is why the work of the OSCE-Ukraine-Russia working group, which is to be renewed in the near future, can bring some results.

Negotiations in Minsk didn’t bring peace to Ukraine. The war is going on, and tension in Donbas is leveling up. What’s next, after the negotiations are finished?

 Andrei Kazakevich, the director of the Institute for Policy Studies Palіtychnaya Sphera (Political Sphere), answered the questions of the EuroBelarus Information Service.

- Minsk negotiations on settling the situation in Ukraine failed, claim most of the experts, who were observing the summit in Minsk, saying that the meeting didn’t bring peace to Ukraine. Do you share this viewpoint?

- I rather don’t. Only those who had great hopes for these negotiations can talk about their failure. But it was clear from the beginning that this meeting won’t bring peace yet – it could have been viewed as an experiment with the new format, an attempt to find additional arena for communication of the ways to settle the problem, quick solution of which we can’t expect.

Let me repeat: taking into account quite long and tough confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, in today’s situation we shouldn’t hope that one meeting can stop the bloodshed.

- Five players took part in negotiations: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the EU. Who was the winner and who lost?

- We can’t put the question about winners and losers, at least because we don’t know all the details. And if we think of the meeting in Minsk as of the beginning of a new stage in negotiation process, as of an attempt to find the basis for the future resolution of the conflict, there is no sense in finding out who has won and who has lost.

But it’s true that the participants of the meeting had different goals. Russia and Ukraine are directly participating in the conflict; their confrontation touches upon their essential political and economic interests (especially in case of Ukraine). For Kazakhstan and especially for Belarus, the most important thing in this situation is to preserve neutrality and somehow minimize the losses, as well as to find variants for defending their own interests in the situation when tension in the region is escalating.

As for the EU, minimization of negative consequences of the conflict is also its main priority – first of all, economic consequences and those in the defence area. The current situation requires from the EU to look for the political, military, and economic mechanisms of restraining Russia, as well as to support Ukraine. Thus, Europe can’t be neutral and it is elaborating its own agenda, though it is not interested in the escalation of the conflict at all.

- Did Lukashenka manage to play the role of the peacemaker? Which dividends will the organization of the tripartite meeting on Ukraine’s problem will bring to Belarus?

- The role of Belarus shouldn’t be overestimated, but its role was quite noticeable. Belarus was hosting contacts, and Belarusan authorities were welcoming partners for Ukrainian and Russian side. Thus, to a certain extent Lukashenka managed to play the role of the peacemaker. By the way, Belarus received considerable international attention, and the behaviour of the Belarusan authorities was convenient for establishing a new format of communication between the parties to the conflict.

As to the dividends Belarus will get, first of all, it is the elevation of the foreign policy prestige: it is for the first time in 20 years of Lukashenka’s rule when such important meeting is being held with the direct participation of Belarus and its obvious role. Apart from that, by participating in the dialog, Belarus gets full information, which provides for better understanding of the situation and forecasting its further development, as well as making accordant economic and political decisions. Moreover, the understanding of the situation opens new possibilities for influencing the political situation, for making decisions, though the possibilities of Belarus are, naturally, limited.

And finally, dragged in communication in the role of a mediator, Belarus gets an opportunity to preserve neutrality in the conflict. The situation suggests that neither Russia nor Europe have neither desire or possibilities to exert pressure on Belarus with regard to the Ukrainian problem. Thus, Belarus escapes pressure and unreasonable risks within the conflict.

- Can the role of the mediator unfreeze Belarus-Europe relations?

- The bilateral relations won’t be unfrozen to the full; however, this role creates very favorable conditions for their improvement. If earlier Lukashenka was the last dictator in Europe, now there is another one – Putin, and in comparison with him, Lukashenka doesn’t look such a problem.

- Let’s go back to negotiations. Minsk remains a platform for negotiations of the OSCE-Ukraine-Russia contact group. Should we expect positive results from the meeting in this format? If the parties didn’t manage to reach agreement at the highest level, then the success of the negotiations at a lower level is very doubtful.

- The meeting at the highest level can only be viewed as a beginning of the process, as establishment of a new format. Let me repeat that we don’t really know what happened at the negotiations; but both the sides affirmed their willingness to move towards the normalization of the relations, which is a good reason for holding further talks in the working format. So we can’t say for sure that the results of the meeting bring the work of the contact group to a halt; the situation is rather vice versa.

I think that the work of the contact group will bring its results. The question is whether the contact group will be able to resolve the conflict to the full, or the agreements will be local – for example, the resolution of the concrete problem with the captives, refugees, hostages, etc.

- After the negotiations it seems that the EU is more concerned about the undisturbed delivery of Russian gas than about the regulation of the situation at the east of Ukraine. Regular consultations on gas between Ukraine and Russia with the participation of EU Commissioner for energy Günther Oettinger are scheduled for September 6. In the situation that appeared after the negotiations in Minsk is it possible to end the gas war?

- It is impossible to finalize the gas war within one meeting. But the beginning of autumn and the following winter aggravates the problem of energetic safety for Europe. It seems to me that in the context of the current situation in order to prevent the disruption of gas supplies to Europe, we should expect intermediate agreements. This is important both for the European countries, as well as for Ukraine and Russia. However, more or less stable regulation of the “gas war” largely depends on the political and economic situation. Russia has always used energy sources for political purposes, and there are no reasons to get out of this habit now.

- The negotiations were accompanied by the activation of Russian aggression in Ukraine. What is the final goal that Kremlin has?

- As for the tactical goals, they are to stop the advance of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian side wanted to resolve this problem, free Lugansk and Donetsk, while for Russia it was very important to save the places of arms that are now occupied by separatists. Russia has reached its goals to a certain extent, as the advance of the Ukrainian army came to a halt, and separatists – with the help of Russian regular army – even performed counterattacks. But Kiev didn’t reach its goal: at the beginning of summer it was planned that the main phase of the anti-terror operation will be finished before the end on August. And, obviously, Ukrainian army won’t stop the anti-terror operation before that time.

If we take strategic goals, I think that Kremlin doesn’t have a concrete and clear goal. If we analyze Russia’s behaviour over the last few months, we can see doubts and attempts to give quick, though not strategic reaction to the events. We see that the Russian management is in a very difficult situation; on the one hand, it can’t make peace with Ukraine due to the inner-political reasons: Russians are very strongly mobilized by imperial and nationalistic slogans, and they won’t understand quick conclusion of peace with Ukraine.

And open intervention into Ukraine, formation of Ukrainian Transdniestria from Donbas, and all other scenarios are a problem for Russia, as they require huge financial resources, military help, and later on – full provision of the regions that are controlled by the separatists. Of course, such actions will disrupt Russia’s stance at the international arena and will worsen Russia’s international isolation.

Russia is adapting to the current events and is reacting to the actions of the West and of Ukraine alternately. But Kremlin, I think, doesn’t have strategic line of further actions towards Ukraine.