Uladzimir Matskevich: Kremlin is forced to endure any tricks of Lukashenka

Russian military action against Belarus can not be considered realistic, reasonable, rational today. But it is very difficult, almost impossible to predict behavior of the cornered Putin's regime.

One of many oil and gas wars ended. Official Minsk seems to have won: it has achieved the resumption of oil supplies in its previous volume (5 million tons in the fourth quarter of 2016), got a discount on Russian gas. But won’t this victory be a Pyrrhic one? Not a single conflict between the "allies" creates an atmosphere of trust, same as no marital quarrel strengthens family ties. What can this mean for Belarus?

Philosopher and methodologist Uladzimir Matskevich replied to the questions of the "EuroBelarus” Information Service.

- Another Russian-Belarusian war is over, oil and gas one. Is it a one more step towards reconciliation or deterioration of the relationship?

- Sometimes the war ends but the problems remain. As in our case. Unlike the previous wars, this became not only a Belarusian problem but Russian as well. So the worst is yet ahead.

- It seems that the parties have reached a state when the Kremlin can not be a sponsor for political loyalty, but Minsk no longer wishes to demonstrate it for free. What will replace the "oil-for-kisses" mechanism of interaction?

- A new mechanism, or a new regime of Belarus - Russia relations has been visible for a long while. It is moderate pragmatism, or the so-called Realpolitik.

Pragmatism is always shown in trade - in a more or less acute manner. In the trade - somewhat like at a bazaar -  two parties name an unrealistic price and then spend a long time looking for a compromise.

Where does the unrealistic price come from? It comes from the market imperfections. There are still no normal market relations between Russia and Belarus; we trade, exchange goods, finance, we have joint projects within the framework of the so-called "union state". But these are no market relations; these are semi-barter highly primitive compensatory schemes, associated with the holes in the customs legislation, in a search of an answer to the sanctions imposed now on Belarus, then on Russia. Therefore, the trade relations between Russia and Belarus come in a form of either a primitive exchange in kind or mutual subsidies, hole patching, sometimes escalating to outright smuggling, corruption and theft. When Belarus was accused of stealing oil and partially gas, which come from Russia, they "forgot" that the leaks took place as agreed upon with the Russian partners.

- Moscow is losing its most effective leverage on Minsk, but is unwilling to let go. What is left in the Kremlin’s arsenal to keep Belarus in its orbit?
- Of all the arsenal there is left: diplomatic pressure, political pressure, the threat of incorporation - either by force or by sophisticated diplomatic moves; nevertheless, this threat is constantly hanging over Lukashenka’s regime.

In addition to it, there are certain factors aggravating the bilateral relations, such as: no matter how  Lukashenka’s regime behaves towards Russia, the Kremlin is forced to endure everything as Putin’s government has no alternative to Lukashenka, who enjoys full support in Moscow. As Kremlin is not ready for a direct military threat or annexation, it is forced to put up with Lukashenko here.

- But many experts claim that the Ukrainian scenario is unlikely to happen in Belarus.

- The thing is that no expert seriously predicted the Ukrainian scenario to happen as well. No one could have imagined at that time that today's events in Ukraine are possible. Threats were analyzed, such a possibility, although hardly probable, was considered, but it was quite hard to seriously expect a direct aggression against Ukraine.

The same is happening now. Putin's policies drive Russia more and more into a corner. And a cornered regime is capable of most irrational actions. Yes, if we examine the situation in Russia objectively, military action or any other kind of agression against Belarus can not be considered realistic, reasonable, rational today. But it is very difficult, almost impossible to predict behavior of a cornered regime. Therefore, we must address the threat from Russia as a serious one, and by no means should we underestimate it.