Now it’s the momentum to improve the Belarusan regime’s entrenched antipathy towards human rights

The present combination of factors enables the West to help Belarus turn toward more democratic and sensible governance, structural economic reforms, and more respect for human rights and freedoms.

The EU and United States need to see commitments and tangible actions from the Belarusian authorities to improve the regime’s entrenched antipathy towards fundamental human rights and freedoms before the sanctions expire in February and March, respectively.

More than five years have passed since Belarus experienced its fraudulent presidential election on December 19, 2010. Then incumbent president Alexander Lukashenka retained his seat for a fourth term with almost 80% of the vote–but the ballots counted arbitrarily and without credible observation. Broad repressions ensued, severely damaging the opposition and civil society of Belarus.

Lukashenka ran that presidential term completely unchallenged by the domestic opposition–an ideal landscape that he had struggled to achieve since first being elected in 1994. Democratic states and international organizations responded to the repressions with principled but half-hearted half-measures. Yet, Lukashenka’s “unhindered” rule did not become his success story. On the contrary, Belarus finds itself in an increasingly precarious situation, with crises building in virtually all dimensions of governance.

This past October, Belarus lived through another election that allowed Lukashenka to stay in power for a fifth consecutive term. This time, he received 83.4% of the votes, but the United States, EU and OSCE predictably concluded that the elections fell short of democratic standards. Nevertheless, the U.S. and EU decided to offer temporary sanctions relief to Belarus, even though Lukashenka’s regime has remained unchanged.

Although the Belarusian president’s rule remains intact, his economic and political model for the country has exhausted its potential. Spurred by an unfavorable external environment, the country’s economic situation has been impaired and the foundation of its statehood, endangered.

Among many developments during these past five years, three stand out: a foreign policy impasse, a planned Russian airbase in Belarus and political and economic gridlock. These factors provide the West with an opportunity to help steer Belarus in a more promising direction.

Belarus is trying to normalize relations with the West without angering Russia

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine served as game changers for Lukashenka. Vladimir Putin sees Belarus in the very same light as Ukraine. However, the difference between the two countries is that Lukashenka made Belarus a model state within Russia’s self-proclaimed sphere of influence–dependent on Moscow’s will, authoritarian and corrupt, pro-Russian and anti-Belarusian–while Ukraine struggles to do away with this pernicious concept.

This pattern of Russia’s punishing and destroying states because of their independent choice revealed to Lukashenka an unpleasant reality. Two decades of foreign policy heavily tilted towards Russia and away from the democratic world left Lukashenka standing alone in an environment that demands reliable partners and alliances.

It turns out that Belarus does not have any foreign policy alternatives to its dependence on Russia. Even Ukraine, with its pronounced choice for democracy, is struggling to mobilize the full support of its friends and allies, as international security mechanisms failed to prevent and roll back Russia’s aggression. For the Belarusian leader, who carries an internationally tarnished reputation, hostile to democratic values and practices, such a mission would be next to impossible.

Lukashenka’s diplomatic team is scrambling to normalize relations with the West. However, it is constrained by apprehensive watching from Moscow as much as by the inability of Lukashenka to implement political reforms out of fear of losing power. The progress in rebuilding relations with the United States and EU is very slow and the lack of trust remains a serious obstacle.

A threat to Belarus’s sovereignty

Russia lately added one more humiliating reminder of the unequal nature of relations between Minsk and Moscow. Russian president Vladimir Putin announced in September that he has ordered his government to sign an agreement to set up an airbase in Belarus.

The idea to establish a Russian military base in Belarus is flawed to the core. It contradicts the Belarusian Constitution–and it risks drawing Belarus into the quagmire of Russia’s war against Ukraine and its standoff with the West and NATO. Also, Russia has demonstrated that it can use military bases to annex foreign lands. So the idea of a Russian airbase in Belarus is a direct threat to Belarus’s independence and sovereignty.

Lukashenka responded in October that such a base was not needed in Belarus. However, in November, a mid-level Russian general publicly revealed some details of the future airbase composition and asked the Belarusian side to speed up the process. Apparently, the president of a sovereign nation did not convince a Russian military official.

Notably, the United States offered a muted reaction, asserting that it respects the rights of nations to sign agreements and establish alliances. In addition, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute expressed doubts that the airbase would affect the security situation for NATO.

However, in Belarus, it is not the nation that decides foreign policy, but the authoritarian ruler with a longstanding deficit of international legitimacy who usurped power and decides foreign policy single-handedly. Ambassador Lute’s vision does not take into account the Crimea precedent, although the Russians have proven that it is real.

Lukashenka refuses to implement economic reforms

It remains unclear what pillars Lukashenka plans to employ to sustain the Belarusian economy: Russia demands concessions on issues critical for statehood; the West wants to see economic and political reforms toward democratization; and elites in Belarus expect certainty regarding the direction for the country. Still, the Belarusian president remains undecided.

In the wake of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the United States and EU have put aside pressuring Lukashenka toward a genuine change in Belarus. Putin’s behavior has made the Belarusian president look more presentable to the world than ever before. He now avoids harsh anti-Western, anti-democratic rhetoric. He released political prisoners and softened his response to street protests.

But though Lukashenka has put repressive practices on hold, he hasn’t dismantle the system that runs them. The president keeps all policies that make his regime authoritarian, repressive and ineffective intact. They can be brought back at any point in time.

The government of Belarus is struggling to avoid major economic collapse. It has asked the IMF for a new financing program, although Minsk has failed to deliver on its 2009 commitments for structural reforms of the economy which it pledged in order to receive an IMF loan. An agreement with the IMF has not been reached yet. And the Belarusian president continues to refuse to implement economic reforms, although such calls become urgent even within his own administration.

Switching gears on the regime in Belarus

Sanctions relief by the United States and EU right after strikingly undemocratic presidential elections has not been matched by substantial reciprocal steps by Lukashenka on the issues that make his rule an authoritarian regime. Still, the temporary and conditional nature of the sanctions relief offers leverage that can be applied to bring about genuine systemic changes in Belarus.

The EU and United States need to see commitments and tangible actions from the Belarusian authorities to improve the regime’s entrenched antipathy towards fundamental human rights and freedoms before the sanctions expire in February and March, respectively. The momentum for such a pragmatic and simultaneously values-oriented approach is apparent. Lukashenka realizes the dangers that his rule and Belarus are facing. He is weak. He needs support and has a lot to offer in return in terms of democratic change.

Under Lukashenka, Belarus is more fragile than ever before. But the present combination of factors enables the West to help the country turn toward more democratic and sensible governance, structural economic reforms, and more respect for human rights and freedoms. Progress in rectifying these indispensable elements of national development is central for Belarus to overcome the systemic crisis of today.

Forbes