Report by Uladzimir Matskevich

Round table on the results of the organized activity game “Elaboration of the victorious political strategy for Belarus 2006: scenarios, projection and programming”, 27 June 2005.
Some things should be explained: those who have been given the program with invitation saw here the surnames of Bogdanovich and Leonov. We had no time to change them though on the Saturday’s morning it was known that none of them would participate. The reason was in the co-ordinate participation refusal of “five+” or “ten” and politicians who were invited on the meeting and namely the discussion with whom on this round table was planned to organize and for what the strategy is elaborating in such public variant. Moreover, the decision was probably made on Friday as in the Friday afternoon it was acknowledged that we are going to gather on Varvasheni Street, 8 but not here and there was not participation refusals.
But without paying attention on the things which happen when we begin to do something I would like to represent for the discussion the strategy of the victory

Moreover, I’d like to speak not about the things which are in the text but which are not in it. There is a footnote at page 18 of the text. This fragment to which this footnote is connected with concerns the discussion of the strategy which authorities practice towards the Belarusian opposition and the actions of the oppositional forces. And it is timed to the main event of 2006, i.e. to the president elections. In general, this strategy has wider context and it is carrying out not depending on the concrete elections for a long time namely in a way I tried to formulate here. One of the main objectives of the state strategy directed against democratic political community is to make democratic movement uncontrolled. And it is noticed in the footnote that more correct is to say “not self-managed”. In this sense the official point of view is that Belarusian opposition is managed from outside, from the West, at first. For me it seems more significant and important is to speak about “reflexive management”. It means, that Belarusian opposition is managed not by itself but by its opponent, i.e. by somebody who works against it or by somebody the opposition is directed against. The regime controls Belarusian opposition. How it works is the subject of another discussion, but I would like to begin the discussion now with the issue: how the opposition is managed from without once again but not sure from Belarus.

It is not a secret and it was discussed for many times, that Belarusian political space is not self-efficient. What takes place on the political space of Belarus is influenced by several actors who are not obligatory to be in Belarus or saying metaphorically, from the law language, who are not the residents of Belarus. In this sense some centres of management can be singled out. They are:
· Belarusian political space is governed from Russia.
· Belarusian political space or Belarusian political situation is governed from the West.
· Namely, of course, there is a possibility to manage Belarusian political situation from the opposition itself, from the democratic politicians themselves.
· And naturally, there, what I’m talking about is reflexive management from the regime.

In any case, in the text it is told about what should be done and how the management of political situation in Belarus should be organized by the opposition itself, Belarusian political leaders, Belarusian resistance; and the strategy of Belarusian authorities is described. I have already named the aim which of this strategy — to make Belarusian opposition uncontrolled or deprived of the management, on one hand, and to raise the barriers for this self-management, on the other hand. And the main aim of the management by opposition is to control the street or to control the active actions of the opposition. Special services and structures are established for this as it is described in the text.

Today I’ll say nothing about the strategy which, as I see it, should be developed on the West in order to influence in some way the development of Belarusian situation. I won’t do this on one simple reason: for a long time I didn’t pay attention on the Western vector of the management. But after I start to come back to politics in the last year October I specially undertook some actions to check the existence of such strategy, the existence of some meaningful actions on the West concerning management of Belarusian situation. There should be correction in my speaking. When I say “management” I mean nothing bad. I mean not manipulation, secret games, “zhido-masson plots” and so on and so forth. I speak simply about management, i.e. about making decisions, fixing strategic goals, determination of the prior tasks and so on. And I have to consider the Western vector of management of Belarusian political situation because big sums of money are allocated from the West into Belarusian third sector, civil society and also, there is no reason to hide, into political sector as well. That’s why, if the are money there should be some goals, plans, strategic schemes. I didn’t find them. I didn’t find them and I must mention that the Western vector of the management of the Belarusian situation is not even total “democracy” but ochlocracy. The poverty of the country which is on the crossing from the “third world” to the second one (if the second world exists today), it such that for Belarusian situation the money, which small western fund can provide, can make significant changes and lead to significant shifts. There are many such small funds which are ready, in their innocence, to give money to help the third sector, democratic organizations, and the civil society. Practically there is no country in the Europe feeling to be a rich country which wouldn’t give some money here: Dutchmen, Danes, Swedes and others — all of them allocate some money. And thank God that Poles and Lithuanians who are even more interested in changes in Belarusian situation don’t give money because they don’t have their own money. But this variety of the actions of different actors considered being the representatives of Europe and America leads to the situation that there is no any management. I can’t say the same about Russia. And properly my speech, what is not marked in the text of the Strategy, will be touched upon Russian strategy now.

I won’t discuss here for a long time but just say that today the main task of Russia is to vindicate itself for the loss in Ukraine during the orange revolution. All Russian activity, all Russian actions are directed on the only thing: inadmissibility of the orange revolution or any colour revolution in Belarus in the nearest years. And the nearest years are, of course, the elections of 2006 and the events after them. And I wouldn’t speak about some other possibilities for the “revolutionary” events at the other times. Revolution, also in inverted commas; it is accepted to say “revolution”, though there weren’t revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine; but as this word appeared in the modern slang I also use it.
There is no sense speaking about the revolutions after 2006 in Belarus because there won’t be foreseen the regime change in the nearest future according to Cuban or Northern-Korean views if he wins in 2006. It will be the final and irrevocable victory for many years. This regime victory will lead to the change of the title nation on this territory and in this country. In this sense there will be red and green Belarusians but not those who began to appear or realize themselves on the wave of Renaissance of 80-s and who pointed things stand in political and cultural space in Belarus. Any non-preconceived analytic, any non-preconceived view on our situation understands that whether the regime change can be timed to the elections in 2006 or it will be never at all. That’s why both my approach and Russian attitude are connected with this event, namely revolution of 2006 or change of regime in 2006. That is why I tell that this should be done; there is no other way out. All discussions about the other “third ways” and other possibilities are simply nonsense. It’s my opinion, my point of view and it is played or acknowledged by the processes on the Game. Now there is no another strategy of the sensible actions which could lead to the positive result except this one.
Russian task is not to allow this. Moreover, as far as I understand, there is fixed or was self-appointment of two subjects, as minimum, who work today on this in intellectual, analytical and projecting way. The first is Fund of the effective policy and Gleb Pavlovsky who must vindicate for Ukraine, for the mistakes which particularly took place there due to his strategic constructions. And the second can be marked by a concrete personal name — Mr. Karaganov who has established even a special body for this purpose with a mission to protect human rights in Belarus. A lot of people joined this body in Belarus including those who were on the Game, for example, E.Tonkacheva, T.Protko, and those who were invited on the Game but didn’t participated in it: A.Belatsky, A.Sheremet, S.Kalinkina and others.

Karaganov’s task, which he does for a long time, and today it’s just identified, is to control and to make the outside management by pro-western part of the civil society in Belarus. That’s why I won’t analyze and criticize what modern leaders of Belarusian opposition are doing if there is no special questions. In general, I even don’t completely understand whether they do it consciously or just get into the trap which Karaganov has made for them. But all of them are the material of the reflexive management from this Russian strategy. Saying metaphorically, when on the level of the brains or the head there is no proper strategy line, this strategy line is imposed by the outer structures.
As for Pavlovsky, today there are no serious actions or events in Belarus which can be interpreted as namely Pavlovsky’s actions. But some indirect sources show us that the “battle reconnaissance” and attempts to invest into particular projects are directed from this camp. As for the project “united candidate”, which is remake of all the mistakes of 2001 in rough and comic form, this project totally and its “strategy” is completely managed by Karaganov, his analytics and designers. That’s why all what belongs to this direction works against the change of regime in Belarus in 2006.

And some words about this famous regime change. Only lazy and fool one of those who try to think about politics and the modern situation didn’t learn the lesson from the Serbian, Ukraine and Georgian events. Those who did it has already have the scheme and this scheme can be described without “the carrots” which I use in my reasoning and without those categories which I usually use but it will be the same as I describe here. That’s why when I publish such strategic things I am not afraid that there is the loss of information, relay and so on and so forth, because all analysts of the regime know about this even better than me. People who are specially engaged in these issues also understand and know very well how the things are organised. Moreover, it does not depend on the power of particular regime. It can be gifttless L.Kuchma, narcissistic S.Miloshevich or fallen into senility hero of Perestroika and cold war E.Shevarnadze and Lukashenko the same.

The scheme of breaking this regime is the same as in all these countries. In some way it differs from that what took place in the beginning of 90-s when the problems were solved in one way of so-called “velvet revolutions” in Czechia, “song revolution” in Lithuania and so on. Of course, each country has its own specification but the scheme is the same. And, perhaps, Belarusian regime is one of the most prepared to such events’ development.

But, as it was marked by some technologists and analytics, even weak regimes which became the victims of “color revolutions” were quite enough reinforced and prepared, so there was only one weak point and only one weak time, when they are shown to be thrown down and to be fought down, - elections. As one analyst figuratively said it is like crabs which are covered by the shell from all sides and become vulnerable only once — when they change their shells. And the same, the regime is vulnerable when the elections take place. Unfortunately for them, no one regime in Europe or in the Post-Soviet countries, which are directed to the west or want to be closer to Europe, to look as Europeans, cannot venture to be illegitimate. All these regimes try to preserve at least appearance of legitimacy and this appearance is provided by elections. More or less all of them are prepared for the elections’ falsification but they are not ready to use rough physical force, or simply saying, to fire at the elections because they are afraid. May be Belarusian regime is prepared for it to the higher degree; at least the moral preparation of the corresponding sub-units and special services is conducted. The moral preparation of those who can give the order to shoot at peaceful people is also conducted. But namely during the elections, elections processes the regime is less ready to do this.

For the nearest ten years only now, in year 2006, the crab has so-called last change of his shell, moult. This is the last regime moult when we can get the victory by non-violent ways.

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