Geopolitical struggle for Belarus

Over the past one and a half challenging years, we have been dealing with the biggest crisis in relations between the European Union and Belarus. Worse still is the fact that there is still a long way to go before hitting bottom. The mutual...

Over the past one and a half challenging years, we have been dealing with the biggest crisis in relations between the European Union and Belarus. Worse still is the fact that there is still a long way to go before hitting bottom. The mutual relationship may deteriorate further at any time. Fortunately, from the history of relations between Europe and Minsk, however harsh the declarations of the Belarusian authorities may sound, there is always a chance to improve relations. In the end, Aleksandr Lukashenko has mastered his policy of manoeuvring between East and West  to perfection.

Nevertheless, it is realistic to expect a further deterioration of the relationship, especially since the conflict was provoked by the Belarusian government, and Minsk’s plans may include an escalation of the cold war. We cannot rule out the possibility that the Kremlin has played a role in this situation. We do not know the exact terms Russia set in exchange for financial support to Belarus on behalf of the Eurasian Development Bank. The economic aspects of the agreement could well have included demands of a political nature. The most recent row with the West, and a nod to its eastern neighbours, may be a reflection of the behind-the-scenes arrangements between Moscow and Minsk. It is no secret that it may be in the Kremlin’s interests to alienate Belarus on the European stage; then Russian capital can eventually absorb the other outposts of Belarusian sovereignty. The point is not that Russia intends to make Belarus its ninth Federal District; just to separate itself from the NATO states with the buffer of a country which it can fully control.

It is unlikely, however, that economic sanctions will be introduced. First of all, Europe understands that the regime lacks any real possibilities for counter-sanctions against the EU, and so it will harass its domestic opposition activists. Any economic embargo would produce a negative reaction in the Belarusian public; the gap between the European community and Belarus would be insurmountable. Secondly, from the technical point of view, introducing sanctions in such a way that only businesses associated with the regime would suffer would be a tremendously difficult task. Thirdly, Belarus is a member of the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan. Any restrictions of an economic nature in relation to Minsk would be quite easy to overcome thanks to the neighbour countries of the Customs Union.

However, Europe is not considering such a scenario. But at the same time, Brussels understands that its room for manoeuvre with Belarus is much less than with Russia. This follows from the fact that it is much more important for Moscow to gain the loyalty of Belarus. In Europe, meanwhile, the active integration of Belarus is mainly being lobbied for by the new EU countries, which have less clout in the European forum than those of the ‘old’ union. Thus, Brussels’ present attitude in its dispute with the Belarusian regime is optimal. By the synchronised withdrawal of all ambassadors of the  EU countries represented in Belarus, European Union has sent a clear signal that it is speaking with one voice, and will not accept any similar blackmail from Lukashenko.

The other shoe has not yet been dropped. We can expect several more years of geopolitical struggle for Belarus. The creation of the Eurasian Union which Vladimir Putin dreams of will not take place in a day. The only correct way to deal with it is increased vigilance. Europe cannot let things slide until there is yet another ‘thaw’, when Lukashenka will need his European neighbours to balance his relations with Moscow and the pressures it puts on his regime.

Source: Ulad Vialichka, Geopolitical struggle for Belarus // EaPCommunity.