Soft Belarusization: A New Shift In Lukashenka's Domestic Policy?

Recently initiatives aimed at promoting Belarusan language have become extremely popular, which to some extent reflects a new national-oriented period in Lukashenka’s policy.

Russian pro-government media outlet Lifenews has recently criticised Lukashenka's decision to not participate in the 9 May Victory Day Parade in Moscow. Many in Russia think that Minsk's integration rhetoric has been replaced with a form of soft Belarusization​. Following the events in Crimea, Lukashenka has begun to demonstrate more support and concern for the Belarusan language and national history.

Still, he is trying to maintain some balance and good relations with Russia for the sake of its economic support. The last time the political scale shifted in this direction, increased rhetoric about independence and more engagement with Europe followed.

In addition to the state's renewed interest in Belarusization and cultural initiatives, support for these changes in society is also on the rise. The 'soft' Belarusization policy and the activity of the organisations such as Art Siadziba are in growing demand in Belarus.

Soft Belarusization as a response to Russian aggression

The term 'soft Belarusization' was employed by Lukashenka publicly for the first time during his open dialogue with the media in January 2015. Judging by his words, it appears that Lukashenka regards Belarusization as means of countering Russian influence. "Some in Russia are bothered by some soft Belarusization … while in Russia they are accustomed to using terms like 'the Russian World', 'soft power'. We have promoted 'soft Belarusization' [at home]," said Lukashenka.

However, the reality after Crimea's annexation has discounted popular opinion (especially among opponents of the regime) that Lukashenka is an ideological supporter of Russia and is willing to sacrifice Belarusan independence, if need be.

On the contrary, after following the events in Crimea, Lukashenka has solidified his role as a mediator and peacekeeper on the Ukrainian issue and has started moving slowly towards promoting a Belarusan national revival. Lukashenka explained his new position by stating, “I support the Belarusan language, because it distinguishes us from the Russians. This is a feature of our nation”.

Language, history and political balance

The Belarusan head of state explained his new policy in simple and straightforward manner in April 2014 when he declared, "we are not Russians, we are Belarusans", a mere month after the occupation of Crimea began. In the past, he has freely spouted off slogans like "Belarus and Russia are one nation" and other similar phrases indicating their oneness.

As of late, he has turned towards employing the Belarusan language in his speeches. The Ministry of Education's own policies also appear to be following Lukashenka's lead. For example, according to Minister of Education Mikhail Zhuravkov, “we will soon come to understand that we need to have more than half of all academic subjects in the Belarusan language”.

Official attitudes towards history have also changed. Previously, the authorities mainly focused their energies on the Great Patriotic War (World War II), but now their opinions have shifted towards early periods of time in Belarus's history. The installation of a monument in honour of Algerd, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, is just one such example, erected in Vitebsk, near the border with Russia, on 27 June 2014 (Vitebsk's City Day).

The Grand Duke Algerd doubled the domain he reigned over through wars with Moscow at a time when Belarusan lands were an essential region in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It is plain for anyone to see how this historical figure does not suit Lukashenka's prior rhetoric about the "historical friendship and unity" of Belarus and Russia.

The Vitebsk Cossacks and the Communists have made an appeal to Minsk, asking Lukashenka not to erect the Algerd monument. Historical memory, as it turns out, is much more important to the authorities than local pro-Russian social movements' support – and the monument was solemnly unveiled as officials from Vitebsk looked on.

Lukashenka justified this move, saying, “At one point in Vitebsk ... some people started saying that because of the [process] 'soft Belarusization', Belarus will lose out on its Russian interests, and so I asked the question: where are our interests? Everything that is on Belarusan territory is our vital interest”.

Altogether this form of Belarusization, i.e. the gradual, largely voluntary extension of the use of the Belarusan language, support for the development and dissemination of Belarusan culture, historical and cultural heritage via the creation of cultural policy, is slowly beginning to take hold.

Not only state: public Belarusization

Of course, this policy of Belarusization is not simply the domain of the Belarusan authorities. In society, demand is growing for the promotion of the Belarusan language and the nation's history and culture. The events in Ukraine have increased these types of initiatives’ popularity and stimulated manifestations of patriotism and national identity.

Consider the recent Festival of Belarusan Culture “Sniezhan” (31 January 2015) or a Belarusan language pub-quiz game “Varta” about Belarusan history (held three times from February-April 2015) that recently sprung up. There is also the independent cultural initiative Art Siadziba (Art Headquarters) that organises a variety of popular events to promote Belarusan culture and the arts and manufactures clothes with traditional Belarusan ornamentation.

Last, but not least, is the “Mother Language Festival”, organised by Art Siadziba 22 February 2015 (International Mother Language Day by UNESCO). Thousands of Belarusans attended free open courses in the Belarusan language called Mova Ci Kava & Mova Nanova in Minsk and many regional towns thanks to growing popular demand.

What Will Belarusization lead to?

Lukashenka, however, has to seek a balance between both sides. On the one hand, he has to use his traditional fraternal rhetoric and alliances with Russia to get it to provide Belarus with loans and discounted energy. On the other hand, Lukashenka needs to guide Belarus away from Russia, be it through a policy of 'soft Belarusization' or improving ties with the West in order to minimise potential threats to Belarusan sovereignty and to his own power.

All of these initiatives aimed at promoting Belarusization – sponsored by the state and civil society – are extremely popular and relevant. To some extent, it reflects a new national-oriented period in Lukashenka’s policy. New possibilities are slowly emerging for Belarusan political and civil actors. Leading up to the presidential election in November this year, one can only view from afar how they use this window of opportunity.

Originally published at BelarusDigest