The role of trust in Latvia-Belarus relations

With the dates of separate Russian-Belarusian and NATO military exercises in the Baltic region fast approaching, one would suspect that relations between Latvia and Belarus would be growing tense.

West 2013 will see more than 9,000 Russian and Belarusian troops on exercise, allegedly conducting defensive operations against a simulated Polish attack on Belarus. Some of those Belarusian and Russian forces will doubtless be deployed near the borders with Latvia and Lithuania. Sometime later, Steadfast Jazz 2013 will see roughly 5,000 troops from NATO member states engaged in exercises along the external borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

Given this intensified military presence in the region, it is interesting to note that Latvian-Belarusian cooperation at the level of ‘low politics’ is actually progressing well. That is to say, there has been a steady increase in opportunities for person-to-person contacts and other forms of cooperation in previous months. On 17 May, consultations were held between the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and the Latvian Foreign Ministry, the first time bilateral talks were held between the heads of the analysis divisions from the two countries’ foreign ministries. This coincided with the Second Latvian-Belarusian Forum of Twin Towns, which facilitated closer relations between municipalities.

Bilateral trade, which itself can be considered a form of cooperation on the level of ‘low politics,’ has also grown. In 2012, the volume of trade between Latvia and Belarus reached €2.7 billion. This figure is expected to grow by an additional 4% in 2013. As such, Latvia is now Belarus’ fourth largest trading partner, the Latvian-Belarusian trade relationship expanding to reach levels comparable to Belarusian-Ukrainian trade. It is also worth noting that Belarus enjoys a substantial surplus in its trade relationship with Latvia.

While a breakthrough at the level of ‘high politics’ – such as an agreement on defence cooperation or some other measure which speaks to a profound level of trust – is unlikely until Belarusian authorities are willing to uphold fundamental principles of democracy and human rights, these simple gestures of amity against the backdrop of large-scale military exercises take on a particular sense of importance. By pursuing closer social, economic, and cultural ties with Belarus, Latvian authorities are indicating that there is at least an implicit level of trust that Belarus will not seek to act against Latvian state interests.

This trust may well result from the Belarusian government’s compliance with the terms of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. This pillar of European security requires Belarus to participate in the exchange and verification of information on military forces in Europe, as well as the admission of base inspections, on-site monitoring of arms caches, and the issuance of prior warning of military exercises like Zapad or Steadfast Jazz. These are what has come to be known in military parlance as ‘confidence and security building measures’ (CSBMs). By complying with the terms of the CFE Treaty, a country is able to demonstrate to its neighbours that it has no intentions of initiating hostilities.

In contrast, the Russian Federation continues to have limited cooperation with neighbouring NATO and EU member states, whether at the level of high or low politics. For example, bilateral trade between Russia and Latvia has been limited to less than €2 billion each year. This is nearly €1 billion less than Latvian trade with Belarus, despite the substantially greater market size and industrial capacity of Russia in comparison to Belarus. The Latvian economy may be more open to Russian imports if there were to be a basic level of trust. However, trust is clearly lacking, in part due to Russian non-compliance with the CFE Treaty.

In late 2007, the Russian Federation announced that it would be unilaterally suspending participation in the CFE Treaty. Russian officials cited a number of reasons for this decision, including the concern that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania did not become parties to the CFE Treaty following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, Russian officials should recognize that this is not a compelling argument for withdrawal from, or the suspension of, the CFE Treaty. As evidenced by NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission, the Baltic states do not possess assets to achieve air superiority in an armed conflict with the Russian Federation. Comparisons between the military capabilities of the three Baltic states with Russia cannot realistically be made. The lack of detailed information on the disposition of the Latvia, Estonian, or Lithuanian militaries does not represent as significant a threat to Russian security as a lack of detailed information on the disposition of the Russian military does for the Baltic states. Furthermore, the presence of air assets contributed by NATO member states to the Baltic Air Policing Mission still must be reported under the terms of the CFE Treaty and the handover of responsibility for the mission at the end of each rotation is widely publicized.

As such, the lack of Baltic participation in the CFE Treaty, while doubtless an issue of irritation for some Russian officials, does not constitute reasonable grounds for Russia suspending participation. At the same time, as indicated by the increased trade with Belarus, it is in the best interests of the Russian Federation to seek to enhance trust rather than undermining it. Depending on the country’s wealth of oil and natural gas alone will limit Russia’s long-term economic growth. At the same time, Russia cannot depend upon its formative ‘Eurasian Union’ as an export market for its value-added goods. In order to ensure the economic growth of the country is sustainable, Russia must diversify both its exports and its markets. The only way to reliably achieve this is to foster trust with its European neighbours, upholding the CFE Treaty and refraining from provocative actions. The Gotska Sandön incident, in which Russian strategic bombers penetrated as far west as an island off the Baltic coast of Sweden before being intercepted by Danish aircraft operating as part of the Baltic Air Policing Mission, has not exactly generated trust in Europe toward Russia.

The choice before Russian leaders is clear: continue to isolate the country and thus deepen Russia’s decline, or follow the Belarusian example and seek to build trust with European partners. When presented with such a choice, a ‘great power’ does not gamble with its economic future.

liia.lv