Pro-Russian lobby is neither influential nor decisive in Belarus, but in case of emergency, Moscow will be supported in Minsk.
Is the Belarusan regime capable of confronting the attempts to introduce Ukrainian scenario in Belarus? Can the pro-Russian lobby in Belarus become a Trojan horse and destroy the Belarusan statehood from within?
EuroBelarus Information Service talked about pro-Russian lobby in Belarus and possible Kremlin’s scenarios at the president election 2015 with Uladzimir Matskevich, the philosopher and methodologist, the head of the Board of the International Consortium “EuroBelarus”.
- How strong is pro-Russian lobby in Belarus? Can it be that Lukashenka will be betrayed by his own command, if Kremlin offers some position in the government? Or is it that the regime still controls the situation?
- As no one from Lukashenka’s encirclement can introduce the course which would be different from that of the current president, it is rather hard to assess how strong pro-Russian lobby in Belarus is. Judging from some indirect signs, we can only guess that the pro-Russian lobby exists.
Throughout Lukashenka’s rule, the majority of Prime-Ministers, except Ling and Novitsky left for Russia and found some cushy jobs there. After the resignation a lot of chief executive officers settled down in Russia, including Latypov, the former head of Administration of the President. If even after the resignation these people are still useful for Russia, it means that they have merited it before they resigned. These facts indirectly prove the existence of pro-Russian lobby in Belarus.
Of course, there are people among Belarusan authorities who are ready to defect to Putin from Lukashenka if they feel danger or if they are promised some preference.
- How strong can this part of the Belarusan authorities affect the state policy?
- There are few chances that this influence will be strong, as it is the dictatorship with a totalitarian bias that is reigning in Belarus. The decisions are made in one centre; not necessarily by one person, but their number is limited. This list includes Lukashenka’s retinues: his sons, his treasurers, or oligarchs, though they are few.
Back in the 90s there were a number of officials among the Belarusan authorities, who represented pro-Russian structures, including the notorious Russian National Unity (RNU). In due time pro-Russian structures were patronized by Oleg Sluka, the deputy of the head of Administration of the President, who was later dismissed from this position to get a post of the Deputy of Minister of Education and continued his patronage of the pro-Russian lobby in this position.
Pro-Russian organizations were also patronized by Sergei Kostyan, who was quite influential person in that time and was the leader of the former the "Belaya Rus'" Slavic Council.
Pro-Russian lobby is neither influential nor decisive in Belarus, but in case of emergency, Moscow will be supported in Minsk.
- Lukashenka has usurped the right to fraternal love to Russia, but for 20 years he persistently prevented any influential Russian force occurring at the Belarusan political scene. However, Belarus has a lot of minor pro-Russian structures, which comfortably work in Belarusan circumstances. On the threshold of the championship the authorities arrested more than 30 opposition activists, whereas Russian National Unity is publicly and with impunity recruiting Belarusans to the so-called “Donetsk orthodox army”. Can these structures become a Trojan horse and destroy the Belarusan statehood from within?
- I wouldn’t recommend underestimating such structures. It is from similar formations that the bandits who are now active in the eastern Ukraine have developed. They are acting secretly but only until they get a command to act. We cannot disregard this factor.
Lukashenka himself is aware of the oncoming danger; he is trying to distance himself from these structures and even impedes their development.
However, informal groups and pro-Russian public organizations is only one side of the coin; we have officials, officers and generals of the defence and law enforcement structures, who are closely connected with the Russian intelligence. Once Lukashenka started purging the state system of pro-Russian lobbyists, but he doesn’t have enough Belarusans to split the bond with the Russian intelligence. If the top brass stabs Lukashenka in the back it will be of great danger.
- For now Kremlin has no need to implement Ukrainian scenario in Belarus – Belarus is to hold president election campaign in 2015, when Russian protégé can be put on the throne with a pretence of legitimacy. Opposition doesn’t have anyone as an alternative to Lukashenka.
- Russia has no substitute for Lukashenka in Belarus; but it doesn’t mean that this situation will last forever. Intelligence services can be preparing some made-up candidate, as it happened in Russia, when Federal Security Service made Yeltsin delegate authority to Putin. But till the Belarusan situation is under Lukashenka’s control, the realization of this scenario is hardly possible, or, in any way, it is difficult to implement.
- Is the Belarusan regime capable of confronting the attempts to introduce Ukrainian scenario in Belarus?
- Of course it is. Russia has already tried to take a neutral stand towards the president election, and neutrality means that Lukashenka’s stance weakens. But Lukashenka has always been making his best to restore Kremlin’s trust and preserve all the power. In 2010 Lukashenka gained the allowance to preserve the presidential position and the whole power literally in ten days.
For now there are now openly pro-Russian politicians in the Belarusan opposition, but some man-made candidate may appear.
- What is your opinion: will Russia preserve neutrality at the president election of 2015?
- For now everything indicates that the current scenario will remain in force in 2015. For some time Russia will be pretending that it is neutral; perhaps, Russia will even pose Lukashenka in the negative light. But by giving promises and making sacrifices Lukashenka will assure Russia’s favor and prolongation of his mandate for the “presidential” authority.
He said Belarus would likely face economic tightening not only as a result of the coronavirus pandemic but also a Russian trade oil crisis that worsened this past winter.
The Belarusan National Platform of the EaP CSF issued a statement in connection with the wave of searches in the editorial offices of the Belarusan media and the detention of journalists.
On September 11, the inaugural „Vilnius Consultations“ conference was organized by Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis and Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Not only does the "Union State" undermine the establishment of civilized relations with Europe, but it hinders the possibility of normal relations between Belarus and Russia.
Belarusan National Platform of the EaP CSF welcomes the dialogue process in the format of the EU-Belarus Coordination Group, the third round of which was held in Minsk on 3-4 April 2017.
The EaP CSF Steering Committee issued a statement on repressions against civil society activists and journalists in Belarus, in view of the demonstrations planned on 25 March 2017.
Belarusan President Lukashenko said on Tuesday a “fifth column” was plotting to overthrow him with the help of foreign-backed fighters, days before a planned street protest in Minsk against a new tax.
The Belarusian regime is not able to pursue a truly multi-vector policy, and the EU cannot decide what it needs in the region on the whole and from Belarus in particular.
He said Belarus would likely face economic tightening not only as a result of the coronavirus pandemic but also a Russian trade oil crisis that worsened this past winter.
In his report, philosopher Gintautas Mažeikis discusses several concepts that have been a part of the European social and philosophical thought for quite a time.
It is impossible to change life in cities just in three years (the timeline of the “Agenda 50” campaign implementation). But changing the structure of relationships in local communities is possible.