Real and declarative readiness to the armed resistance in case of invasion to the Belarusan territory makes a big difference.
Unstable character of Belarusans’ “economic state of health” doesn’t influence the growth of Lukashenka’s approval rate.
The national survey conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) didn’t reveal new tendencies in the public opinion. While 54.2% of the respondents believe that Belarusan economy is in crisis though back in June there were 57.7% of people who thought so, real earnings of the population got frozen: average income per one family member likewise June makes up $288.
After the Crimean campaign the level of trust to Lukashenka is increasingly growing: from 45.9% in March to 53.5% in September. For three months (June-September) Lukashenka’s approval rate also grew from 39.8% to 45.2%.
Belarusians’ foreign policy orientations have grown considerably colder towards Europe and became more alert towards Russia.
“EuroBelarus” Information Service took the comments on the most noticeable tendencies of the latest three months from the expert Siarhei Nikaliuk.
- In September Lukashenka's electoral rate grew to 45.2%, while back in June it made 39.8%. The experts claim that it is due to Ukraine that his approval rate grew by leaps and bounds over the latest 6 months. Is it true to say that?
- There’s nothing to argue about there. During this year we don’t observe the longstanding dependence of Lukashenka’s electoral rating on the dynamics of real earnings of the population. In the 2000s there was only one such exception in 2009. But this was a year of a world financial crisis, and Belarusans agreed on the fact that Lukashenka is not responsible for too modest growth of their income.
- Almost 49% of those who are expecting changes believe that they are possible under Lukashenka’s rule, too; 38.4% are of the opposite view. Is it a new trend?
- What’s new about it? The level of those who put faith in Lukashenka’s ability to change people’s lives doesn’t exceed the level of his approval rate (electoral – 45.2%, trust – 53.5%). So everything makes sense.
- Simultaneously with that Belarusans are increasingly distancing themselves from the surrounding world: people’s orientations have grown considerably colder towards Europe and became more watchful towards Russia, even though only three months ago disappointment in Europe has noticeably increased pro-Russian sentiments among Belarusans. What has caused this turn?
- What is known as public opinion in the Western understating is still absent in Belarus. Everything that is recorded during national social polls is echo of media events. Under the influence of Russian propaganda the majority of Belarusans perceived annexation of Crimea as their own “small victorious war”. The desire to integrate with Russia to the prejudice of the European integration originates from that as well. But gradually the patriotic theme started to unroll on the Belarusan TV-channels, and that led to the decrease in the number of those who support integration with Russia.
There are serious changes in the Belarusan society behind these jumps and gestures.
- Answering the questions “if Russia tried to incorporate the whole Belarusan territory or its part with the weapon in arms, what would you do?” 25.9% of the respondents said “I would withstand that with the weapon in arms”, 39.7% - that they “would try to adjust to the new situation”, 13.3% would welcome these changes. Back in June these indicators made up 14.2%, 47.7%, and 16.5% accordingly. Does it mean that the society is getting to feel the threat from Russia?
- The wording of the questions does not coincide. If in June people were asked whether they find it possible to incorporate the whole Belarusan territory or its part, and what would they do if it happened, than in September the question was “If Russia was trying to incorporate the whole Belarusan territory or its part with the weapon in arms, what would you do?” Thus, it is incorrect to compare the results of the answers.
However, real and declarative readiness to the armed resistance in case of invasion to the Belarusan territory makes a big difference.
- Can we say that in their geopolitical choice Belarusans are getting more and more inclined to neutrality?
- Belarusans are getting inclined to the side from which the media wind is blowing. The change of geopolitical choice is a geopolitical problem.
- 52.2% of the respondents assess the new Ukrainian authorities as fascist, and 32.2% disagree with that. Can we explain such attitude to the new Ukraine with the domination of the Russian propaganda?
- We should explain it with the desire of 52.2% to accept such domination of Russian propaganda. No propaganda can mould anything according to a loosely drawn program; it can only reinforce fears, fixations, and myths that already exist in the society.
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