Until Belarusan regime abandons declared pro-Russian stance we can’t expect Belarusan Orthodox Church to become independent.
According to “Levada-center”, about 70 per cent of Russians define themselves as Orthodox. According to the data of the common research of the Center for Social and Market research SOCIS, sociologic group “Rate”, Center of Razumkov, 74 per cent of Ukrainians still name themselves adherents of the Orthodox religion. But why Russian Orthodox Church that has its influence both in Russian and in Ukraine isn’t trying to stop the conflict? What is its role in settling the situation?
Uladzimir Matskevich, philosopher and methodologist, answered the questions of the “EuroBelarus” Information Service.
- What stance did Russian Orthodox Church take in the Russia-Ukraine war and what role did it play in its escalation?
- After the collapse of the Soviet Union new Russian authorities were constantly having problems with ideology, state program, and Russia’s development concept. In different times different ideologies were tried out: liberal – first radical one, then a milder and more “diluted” one; continuity of party ideologies of the times before revolution – the one that belonged to Constitutional Democrats – were also considered. However, conversion to the Russian Orthodox Church the most convenient one. And, maybe, without any particular desire, it substituted the absent Russian ideology, Russian idea, and country’s development concept. Since Orthodoxy is a quite archaic religion that inherited a lot from the state church of the Russian Empire, one of the main points in building Russian Orthodox Church that doesn’t touch upon dogma, is the so-called Concordance, or harmony between the secular and church authorities. It means that the head of the Church and the head of state constantly coordinate their policies.
One of the biggest dangers for any Christian Church is its connection with the state. If the state declares certain religion to be a state religion and sets a certain goal, the church comes into a very complicated situation since it largely depends on the state. Usually state doesn’t ask the church for anything extraordinary. However, in uneasy situations state might demand certain services from church in exchange for support, as it happened with the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Instead of defining the position of the church as a large social institute based on religion or coordinate its stance with the Russian Orthodox Church with coreligionists in Ukraine, Russian Orthodox Church completely supports the stance of the ruling regime. If this regime is at the state of war with the country that is also traditionally orthodox, the church becomes divided and steps against its own coreligionists.
We should mention that this situation is not unique. Many churches of European countries found themselves in the same situation on the eve of the World War I, when representatives of Catholic, Uniate, Lutheran, Protestant and partially Orthodox Churches were chaplains in the armies on both sides of the front. That is why secularization – separation of Church from the state – is not finishing in the Age of Enlightenment and is just as topical in the XXI century. If secularization hasn’t been finished, we got exactly what we now observe in the Russian Orthodox Church.
For now connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian intelligent services wasn’t made public. In this case church in Russia exists not only thanks to the financial support of the state and economic preferences; the career of the priest cannot be made without support in Russian intelligent services and support of the Russian state. Formally declared principle of independence of church from the state isn’t fulfilled in practice.
- Russian propaganda is calling Ukraine a “fascist state” and doesn’t stop telling about oppression of Orthodoxy. How real are these oppressions?
- As to Ukraine that is named as “fascist state” by Russian ideologists, Russian authorities, and even some figures in the Russian Orthodox Church, we should emphasize that from all post-Soviet countries that are left out of the EU it is in Ukraine where the biggest freedom of conscience and freedom of faith is. It is in Ukraine where Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism feel much more free than in any country in the world. To say that Ukraine’s actions are against Orthodoxy, Catholicism, or any other church is to lie bluntly.
- How natural is the process of separation of the Russian Orthodox Church into two: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev patriarchy and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow patriarchy?
- I need to go back to the principle of concordance that orthodox churches inherited since Byzantium. This principle isn’t cancelled in Orthodox Churches, which means that it creates a need of Church’s autonomy in every independent state where Orthodoxy has big flock. It is an absolutely unbearable situation for any country if the faithful have to submit to the command of the church that is situated in a different country and has concordance with the authorities of that country.
If Ukraine is an independent country, if Belarus is an independent country, together with the principle of concordance between the church and the state these countries need to aim at autonomy, independence, or autocephaly of their orthodox churches. Appearance of Kiev patriarchy is a natural process of acquiring or strengthening Ukraine’s sovereignty, and this process started long before Russia-Ukraine war started. War made this process irreversible.
- Russian Orthodox Church is advocating the doctrine of a one nation that consists of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusans. Russian Orthodox Church has already clarified itself with Ukraine, so it is only Belarus that is left, isn’t it?
- Tendencies towards independent Belarusan Orthodox Church have begun to show back in early 90s. Under the former metropolitan Belarusan Orthodox Church has acquired certain independence de facto despite being a territory and a subdivision of the Russian Orthodox Church. All the members of the Orthodox Church, who live at the territory that submits to the Russian Orthodox Church are automatically listed as Russians in the understanding of Moscow patriarchy.
In Russia Orthodox Church there is a notion of “canonical territory of Orthodoxy”. The notion of “freedom of faith” and personal choice of faith, church, and territory subject to administrative or state government are confused. Faith belongs to a person, to a personality, and spreading faith to a territory is not an archaism; it is a philosophical, theological, political, judicial mistake, even nonsense. That is why parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus are certain fifth columns of Russia. Russian Orthodox Church can organize chauvinistic and imperialistic propaganda and spread black-hundred books. It can’t but concern Belarusan state that has been trying to restrict the spreading of all kind of subversive activities through parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church. The problem exists and is recognized at the very top.
But until Belarusan regime abandons declared pro-Russian stance we can’t expect Belarusan Orthodox Church to become independent. It can be done if there is political will on the part of the Belarusan state.
But Russian revanchists and ideologists cannot abstain from using the equivocal stance of the Belarusan orthodoxy and are using it all out.
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