Belarus president election is a good chance to remind the EU about our inner issues

In Belarus, the date of the election has the greatest meaning, both in regards to the campaign process and the final result, writes Anna Maria Dyner.

In Belarus, the presidential election, or “voting” as some simply call it, are in fact a very special moment for the economic and political life of that country. This is a time when Belarusian politics, both at the domestic and international level, become intense. Paradoxically, on election day, as the 2006 and 2010 elections illustrated, the final results are far less important than the reactions of the authorities. On the other hand, the international community mostly focuses on what happens before the election and how it was carried out.

In Belarus it is actually the date of the election that has the greatest meaning, both in regards to the campaign process and the final result. The truth about the latter, as all independent experts in Belarus admit, is only really known to Lukashenka’s inner circle. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the decision to move the election date from November 15th 2015 to October 11th 2015 was widely commented on.

The decision to move the election could be interpreted as an attempt to make life difficult for the opposition. Indeed, summer is not the best time for running political campaigns, especially when one has to collect signatures for candidates intending to run. However, the truth is that for the opposition, which is divided, has no leader, no united idea for its campaign and no programme for Belarus, one additional month more would have made no difference.

Two important events

Some experts, probably rightly so, attributed the change of date to the worsening of the economy. It seems that the Belarusian president was looking to accommodate two important events: the election and negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The latter refers to another loan (as the 2009 loan has already been paid off) for Belarus and has already reached an advanced stage of negotiations with the IMF mission coming to Belarus in July 2015. It is almost certain that IMF support will not come by the time the campaign ends. At the same time, it is also quite clear that Belarus badly needs cash and the faster the talks come to a conclusion, the better for Minsk.

A different yet related issue is that of the need to introduce necessary reforms. Nobody, not even the government, expects that the IMF will lend the money unconditionally based solely on some foggy assurances from Belarus this time around. After the experience in 2009, when the IMF succumbed to these types of promises, expectations this time will be much higher. This, in turn, could lead to some real changes in the Belarusian economy, including, for example, a significant increase in waste service fees, something that the voters would be very much against.

In addition, an October date for the election decreases, to some degree, the probability of strikes breaking out in Belarusian state-owned enterprises. Although nerves are high due to the worsening condition of the economy (which can partially be blamed on the crisis of the Russian market deepened by the sanctions), the summer period is a time when everybody either relaxes in their dachas or prepares canned food and pickles for the winter. After that, it is back to school – another period when nobody is thinking about organising a protest.

However, Belarusians quite often show their discontent in unexpected ways. Take the example of the recent, already legendary, football match between Belarus and Ukraine. Not only did the fans of both teams greet each other in both Ukrainian and Belarusian, but they were also chanting anti-Putin slogans. The effect was immediate. After the match, the Belarusian secret service put the fans under surveillance. And while prior cases of political engagement by sport fans were rather few and far between, it is clear that, just like anywhere else in the world, Belarusian football fanatics are well-organised and can easily turn into protest agitators. Therefore, the possibility that the autumn football season will be hot, and not just in terms of the sport on offer, cannot be ruled out. This will be especially true when the Belarusian and Ukrainian, or Belarusian and Russian teams meet during European matches (e.g. the Europa League or the Champions League). Moreover, from a political point of view, football matches have an additional advantage: they are transmitted live around the world.

Even though one swallow does not make a summer, we cannot forget that some seemingly unimportant events – such as the students’ protest at the Maidan in late November 2013 – have already proved that a course of events can go in a completely unexpected direction. Aware of such a threat, the Belarusian authorities will try to do everything they can to prevent the protests, at least until the election. What happens after is less of a concern, at least for now.

Explosive combination

Nevertheless, appeasing society will only get more difficult as time goes on. This is mainly because of an increased number of strikes where workers demand higher salaries. Given the state of the Belarusian economy at the moment, it is quite clear that these expectations may become increasingly difficult to meet. As a matter of fact, this year, for the first time in a long while, Belarusian workers have started to experience the threat of losing their jobs. Some forecasts indicate that in late 2015, the unemployment rate may exceed six per cent. This indicator may not seem high at first, but its interpretation needs to take into account the fact that such a large number of people without jobs has not been seen in Belarus for over 15 years. In previous years, the official unemployment rate never exceeded one per cent.

In addition, more and more Belarusians are being employed on a part-time basis. This, together with shrinking salaries (data offered by Polish-owned Belsat TV suggests that in the first months of 2015, salaries in Belarus decreased by seven per cent) makes for an explosive combination. Furthermore, the salaries, which are not high to begin with (an average salary in Belarus is around 440 US dollars per month) are gradually being eaten up by inflation. For the period of January 2015 to June 2015, inflation was at 15.4 per cent when compared to the same period in 2014. This has led to a situation where a decrease in income automatically translates into a decrease in internal demand for goods and a direct blow to Belarusian enterprises, further negatively affecting the economy.

To make matters worse, there seems to be no relief on the horizon. The reason behind this situation is the poor state of the Belarusian economy, but the real underlying cause is the economic crisis in Russia, which is not only the primary market for the sale of Belarusian goods but also the biggest investor and creditor to Belarus. The only thing that Russia can offer that country at the moment is to provide some loans to pay off its previous debt obligations. At the moment, it is difficult to expect much more, which means that Lukashenka will not be able to save the budget by selling strategic enterprises. However, it is also fair to say that if Belarus’s military companies, like the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant, were offered for sale, Russia would not have trouble finding money to buy them.

Deep divisions, once again

Normally, this kind of situation would be paradise for the opposition. It would not only highlight all the weaknesses of the current government, but also include those who demand change. However, in Belarus, independent movements and organisations have no potential for significant social mobilisation. It is also difficult to imagine the divided Belarusian opposition unifying under one banner. The weakness of the opposition groups, especially the lack of unity among them, can be seen in the fact that only a few people opted to participate in the election. This includes Tatsiana Karatkevich,(an activist backing the “Speak the Truth” campaign), Anatoly Liabedzka (the chairman of the United Civic Party of Belarus), Siarhei Kaliakin, (the leader of the Belarusian Left Party “A Just World”) and Siarhei Haidukevich, (chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party).

As a result, the opposition has, time and again, squandered its chance to create an election product called “a common candidate”. Research by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) has shown for years that such a candidate would have around 25 per cent share of the vote. However, even before the election campaign was officially launched, the idea of having a unified opposition candidate – Mikola Statkevich, a respected prisoner of conscience and a former candidate in the 2010 presidential election – had already been lost. His candidature would have had two advantages: firstly, it would acquaint Belarusian society with Statkevich’s situation and secondly, it would demonstrate a real boycott of the election or, as some people wanted, a withdrawal from participating in an electoral farce (since it would be impossible for Statkevich to be registered at all). However, the representatives of different parties did not agree with such a decision, showing once again the deep divisions that characterize Belarus’s opposition.

It is important to note that not all of the blame should be placed on the opposition. Other major obstacles faced by political parties include the lack of opportunities to raise funds for a campaign and the advantage enjoyed by Lukashenka when it comes to media access. This is especially true during the summer when Lukashenka is in his element, making field trips and visiting farmers in the regions.

Guaranteed victory

At the time of writing this article, we can say with almost near certainty that Lukashenka will once again be elected Belarus’s president. While the final result is uncertain, nobody will be surprised if the president gets around 80 per cent of the vote. While it is difficult to question the support that Lukashenka enjoys in his country, which guarantees him victory in the first round of voting, it is clear that such a high score does not reflect reality. As a March 2015 IISEPS research poll showed, the answer to the question of Lukashenka’s support is two-fold. Firstly, there is nobody to replace him (38 per cent) and secondly, under Lukashenka, life will be better in the future (35 per cent). At the bottom of the list were Lukashenka’s achievements and the quality of his governance. In June 2015 as many as 40 per cent of Belarusians declared their intention to vote for him again. However, since the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine, Lukashenka’s ratings have not gone below 30 per cent and in September 2014 even reached 45 per cent – a level of support which even in a democratic country (and without a strong opposition) should guarantee Lukashenka victory.

Nevertheless, the voting process in Belarus remains highly opaque. The biggest criticism levelled by the OCSE regarding the Belarusian electoral system relates to the way that votes are counted. The Central Election Commission may have tried to reach out to disabled voters (for example, by improving access to visually impaired voters), which was one of the complaints made by the OCSE observers, but this alone is not going to solve the critical problem of electoral procedures. Moreover, it is simply not enough to install new, see-through ballot boxes, when the entire voting system needs an overhaul. The authorities have also barred representatives of the opposition from participating in the electoral commissions and make it impossible for observers to be present at vote counting. This is, of course, the most delicate point in the process, especially when you consider the old Soviet saying that “it does not matter who votes, it matters who counts the votes”. Furthermore, given that around one-third of the voters vote before election day (this is a Belarusian characteristic which is meant to increase turnout), nobody really knows what happens to the votes cast before election day. With all this taking place, Lukashenka has invited “all interested parties” to observe the 2015 election in Belarus.

Lukashenka’s goal is clear and includes not only a victory in this year’s election but also recognition of its legitimacy from EU states, which would significantly increase Belarus’s chances in receiving economic assistance from western countries. This is precisely where some people see a chance for Statkevich to be released from prison. The recognition of Lukashenka as a “legitimately elected” president by the West can give him a chance to strengthen Belarusian security and its position in the region, especially considering the highly uncertain future of the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the overall situation in Ukraine. Having friends amongst the EU states could become an important bargaining chip for Minsk. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus does not have many allies in the West.

What’s next?

Despite some similarities with previous campaigns, the current presidential campaign is taking place at a point where there is significant upheaval taking place in the region. Lessons from the Ukraine crisis have been learnt not only by the authorities but by society as well, which was terrified by the bloodshed that took place on Kyiv’s Maidan in 2014, as well as the aftermath with the loss of Crimea, the war in Donbas and the economic crisis. Paradoxically, the Ukrainian situation is an advantage to Lukashenka, whom a majority of Belarusians perceive as a guarantor of their country’s stability. However, the “new-old” president is facing some new economic and security challenges. Unquestionably, the issue of relations with neighbouring states will be of great importance in this regard. These neighbouring states do not only include Russia, but also Ukraine and the regional states that are members of the EU. The latter can play an even more important role given the fact that now, more than ever, the EU seems ready to start a dialogue with Minsk and is only waiting for a gesture of goodwill from Belarus, i.e. the release of political prisoners. Above all, to ensure Belarus’s independent position, Lukashenka must guarantee himself as much independence as possible, both in the economic and military spheres.

The Belarusian president will also try to take advantage of some of the EU’s own (internal and external) problems, including the issue of North African refugees and the difficult situation in Ukraine. It is clear that when put in a wider context, Belarus can be a normal neighbour to the EU. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that some EU states will be able to accept another term of Lukashenka’s presidency. By acting this way, the EU states should also be aware that Russia is quietly counting on EU support to help Belarus which would somewhat ease the Russian economy, as the collapse of the Belarusian economy would also be Russia’s problem.

All in all, the presidential election is a good opportunity to remind everybody about the issues inside Belarus. More importantly, it is a chance to reflect on the fact that if the EU does not take a pro-active policy towards Minsk (at least one that is based on Andrei Sannikov’s rule: one gesture towards the regime, two towards the opposition), it would be implicitly acknowledging that Belarus belongs in the Russian sphere of influence.

New Eastern Europe