Julia Serbina: Russia will do everything to disrupt the elections in Ukraine

The election rush in Ukraine is taking place in new circumstances: pro-Russian candidates lost the support of usually loyal Crimean voters. However, Russia isn’t going to let the elections drift.

“EuroBelarus” Information Service asked Julia Serbina, the senior researcher of the Regional branch of Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic Studies in Odessa, to analyze the preparation process for the presidential elections in Ukraine.

- The presidential race in Ukraine is gaining in strength. What are the main problems that concern the Ukrainian expert community before the upcoming elections? Is there any chance that a pro-Russian candidate will win the elections? Is there any influence of Moscow on the pre-election campaign?

- The influence of Russia has always been present in the Ukraine’s electoral processes irrespective of the level of the electoral body (even during local election campaign the candidates from south-eastern regions used the pro-Russian rhetoric). But today the importance of the Russian factor has transformed. During the previous campaigns Russia tried to follow the principles of “soft power”, creating loyal civil society organizations, broadcasting its position through the media, which in general – if we take into account the representation of pro-Russian political forces in the government - yielded results. In 2014 they tried to impose their influence by annexing Crimea, threatening with a military invasion and strengthening “trade wars”.

The presidential elections in Ukraine in 2014 have a range of peculiarities. First of all, due to the amendments to the Constitution president’s powers are getting narrow. However, this institutional aspect is left aside because the symbolic meaning of a presidential post is very significant. On the one hand, administrative resources will be either limited or will not be used at all, as the vertical line of control is not as strong as it used to be. These elections have the potential to become one of the most transparent and free elections of Ukraine for the past 10 years. The control of the OSCE and PACE observation missions will be sufficiently serious. On the other hand, Russia will strongly contribute to the destabilization of the situation in the South-East of the country trying to disrupt the elections, to reduce the appearance and to stir up the separatist sentiment. Although, over the past weeks the pro-Russian actions have been in decline, sporadic clashes are generally staged and oriented on the viewers of Russian TV channels as they serve additional grounds for the Kremlin propaganda.

A wide range of “independent” international observers loyal to Russia should also be expected (as it happened during the “referendum” in Crimea). They will try to record the violations, even if there are none, only to de-legitimize the election process.

As far as the pro-Russian candidates are concerned, they are represented in a reasonable proportion. The total number of citizens to support them (among those who have already decided on their choice) is about 20% which is almost 30% less than those who support the pro-European candidates (according to the research conducted by the Consortium of Sociological Centers of Ukraine on March, 26). At the same time it should be noted that about 20% of voters are undecided.

One part of the pro-Russian candidates is seriously aimed at victory at the elections; the candidates declare the theses recommended by the Foreign Ministry of Russian Federation (the Russian language as the second official language, referendum on self-determination for every Ukrainian region, etc.). Other part of candidates will perform formal functions to discredit their opponents; the rest will try to stay in the electoral field preparing for the possible early parliamentary elections.

At the same time, the annexation of Crimea provided grounds to exclude the territorial constituencies on the peninsula from the electoral process. But given the fact that traditionally Crimea supported pro-Russian candidates and parties, any pro-Russian candidate will lose about 700 thousand votes which may become a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the vote.

Moreover, the psychological effect of the possible military intervention can mobilize previously hesitant and apolitical electorate, as well as those voters who supported the Russian vector before the annexation of Crimea.

If the election process is constructive, the probability a pro-Russian candidate to win the presidential elections is low. A more serious threat may present the candidates who do not support Russia publicly, but who have been involved into high level negotiations with it during previous years.